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Executive Summary 
 
The research examined the possible effects of rapid climate change on fuel poverty 
(needing to spend more than 10% of income to maintain a satisfactory level of 
warmth and other energy services in the home). One particular concern was the 
prospect that there might be a shutting off of the Gulf Stream, which warms Britain 
and the rest of north-western Europe. Computer simulations of the climate indicate 
that shutting down the Gulf Stream would cool England by about 3°C. Climate is not 
the only variable that will affect future levels of fuel poverty. The other main ones are 
what will happen to the energy efficiency of the building stock, to incomes and to 
energy prices. The aim of the project was to examine what might happen to each of 
these four dimensions and construct three scenarios in each dimension (most likely, 
high and low) to capture the range of variation in possible outcomes. A total of 81 
(3x3x3x3) scenarios were modelled and analysed. Since any changes in the climate 
system take decades to play out, but it is extremely difficult to predict social, 
economic and technological changes even 25 years in the future, it was decided to set 
an objective for this research of looking forward to 2030. 
 
The Government has a target to abolish fuel poverty ‘as far as reasonably practical’  
by the end of 2016. It has also set the target of reducing UK carbon dioxide emissions 
by 60% from 1990 levels by 2050, implying a 40% reduction by 2030. The outcomes 
of the scenarios modelled were compared against those targets. 
 
It was found that even with increasing temperatures, the sort of energy efficiency 
improvements likely by 2030 would be insufficient to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions from households by 40% from 1990 levels. However, if all technically 
possible energy efficiency measures were carried out by 2030, the target would be 
met with increasing temperatures and would almost be met even if the Gulf Stream 
shut down. That would be a challenge for policy, as it would involve insulating solid 
walls, which is difficult, expensive and controversial. 
 
It was found that fuel poverty diminishes from recent levels in most scenarios, 
although it rises in some, but that in order for fuel poverty to be reduced to extremely 
low levels, what is required is a redistribution of wealth to boost the incomes of the 
poorest by much more than could be expected from economic growth alone. A large 
improvement in energy efficiency is also required. If fuel poverty is to be eliminated, 
extensive solid wall insulation is not necessarily required because micro-CHP can do 
almost as much as solid wall insulation to reduce bills, although it does not have 
nearly as much effect on reducing carbon emissions, so the carbon reduction target is 
not met. 
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Introduction 
 
One issue that global warming might be expected to actually help with is fuel poverty. 
However, it will very probably weaken, and may possibly stop, the thermohaline 
circulation (THC). One part of the THC is the Gulf Stream, which becomes the North 
Atlantic Drift that warms Britain and the rest of north-western Europe. Climate 
change could possibly make Britain become colder, not warmer over the next few 
decades (Hulme 2003). If that were to be the case, it would increase fuel poverty 
compared to what it would be otherwise. The ESRC commissioned this research to 
examine the possible impacts of climate change involving both warming and cooling 
on fuel poverty. 
 
Fuel poverty is defined as a household needing to spend more than 10% of its income 
on energy in order to maintain a ‘satisfactory’ level of warmth (DTI/DEFRA 2001). 
This is set at 21°C in the living room and 18°C in other rooms. The effect of any 
change in climate on the level of fuel poverty will depend not simply on external 
temperatures, but on the level of insulation of the home, the heating technology, the 
price of energy, the amount of economic growth experienced and the effect of 
changes in levels of inequality on incomes among vulnerable groups. The approach 
taken to the research was to model the effects of these factors. 
 
Since even rapid climate change would take a few decades to change temperatures by 
a few degrees, it was necessary to look at how all those different factors might 
develop over the next decades. The scenarios examined the effects by 2030 because 
effects that are rapid in terms of the climate system will necessarily take decades to 
play out. We did not look more than 30 years into the future because the social and 
technological changes that can be expected make prediction extremely difficult and 
uncertain. 
 
What will happen to fuel poverty in future will depend not only on external 
temperatures, but on the level of insulation of the home, the heating technology, the 
price of energy, the amount of economic growth experienced and the effect of 
changes in levels of inequality on incomes among vulnerable groups. A matrix of 
scenarios were developed varying according to different outcomes not only for 
external temperatures, but the other dimensions identified in order to construct a 
series of models describing the range of potential effects of climate change on fuel 
poverty. For each of the four dimensions, three scenarios were developed and they 
were combined to produce a grid of 81 (3x3x3x3) different scenarios. In each case, 
the central scenario represented what was considered most likely and the other two 
cases represented the extreme cases. Since a shutdown of the THC by 2030 is very 
unlikely, the other extreme cases were also unlikely. The aim of the project was not to 
predict the future, but to show the range of the possibility space within which the 
future might be found. 
 
Possible climate change impacts 
 
Climate impacts from greenhouse gas emissions are calculated on supercomputers 
using global circulation models (GCMs). Most current GCMs predict that following a 
‘business as usual’ path of increasing emissions the Earth as a whole will most likely 
warm by one to several degrees Celsius over the course of the century (IPCC 2001). 
 6
 
There are two categories of variation: uncertainty about future levels of emissions and 
uncertainty about the climatic impact of emissions. The uncertainties about future 
emission levels boil down to uncertainties about the level of economic growth, the 
pattern of energy intensity and the fuel mix used to provide energy. The uncertainties 
about the climatic impact are much more complex. Essentially, there are a number of 
feedback mechanisms that are not well understood. The effect of clouds on warming 
is not precisely understood and changes in cloud cover may either reduce or amplify 
warming. Conversely, there are sources of greenhouse gases that could strongly 
amplify warming beyond the levels currently predicted in most GCMs. Unlike other 
GCMs, the Hadley Centre’s models take account of the interaction between the 
climate and the carbon cycle. Forests and soils are both currently absorbing very large 
amounts of carbon, but the Hadley Centre predicts that will fall off very rapidly, 
making climate change develop more quickly and with more intensity than in simpler 
models (Cox et al. 2000). 
 
A different uncertainty is about the sensitivity of the THC to global warming. It is 
thought that warming of a few degrees will most likely only reduce the strength of the 
THC by around 15-25% (Hulme 2003). No climate models predict collapse of the 
THC by 2030 and in those that do predict collapse later the warming by that point 
usually more than offsets the cooling, so that temperatures are lower, but remain 
above present-day levels. However, it is possible that the THC is much more sensitive 
to temperature variations and could be greatly diminished or even switched off 
entirely once an unknown threshold is passed. After the completion of this research it 
has been reported that collapse of the THC is more likely than previously thought 
(Schlesenger et al. 2005). The THC warms the air over the North Atlantic, the British 
Isles and Scandinavia by several degrees C. A simulation of the collapse of the THC 
after the threshold is crossed found a rapid cooling by 3°C in a few decades and a 
further gradual cooling by another 3°C over several centuries (Rahmstorf and 
Ganopolski 1999). A more detailed simulation by the UK Meteorological Office 
predicted a rapid cooling by 3°C in central England temperatures over a few years 
after the THC was instantaneously switched off (Vellinga and Wood 2002). In this 
simulation, the cooling was greatest in the first decade due to reinforcement by sea ice 
effects, before lessening slightly. 
 
The literature indicates that if the THC switched off there would be greater cooling in 
winter than in summer (Rahmstorf 2003). That is important, because it would increase 
the impact on energy consumption and fuel poverty. However, Hulme (personal 
communication) and Wood (personal communication) state that the seasonal 
difference is small. 
 
It should be noted that a 3°C cooling is in a climate with constant levels of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The United Kingdom Climate Impacts 
Programme (UK CIP) has examined a range of scenarios for the likely effects of 
climate change on the UK over the course of the century. For the purposes of this 
project, an estimate of around 1°C was taken to be the approximate level of likely 
warming. 
 
That means that in the unlikely event that the THC collapses by 2030, the degree of 
net cooling that could be expected would be around 2°C. The cooling would be 
 7
slightly greater in the winter than the summer. To give some sense of what such a 
cooling would mean, London temperatures would become like temperatures in 
Bergen are in the present day. 
 
Since collapse of the THC is unlikely, it is sensible to compare its effects with what is 
likely to happen (warming of around 1°C) and with a similarly unlikely change in the 
other direction. Mike Hulme advised that since collapse of the THC so soon is not 
predicted by any climate model, an amount of warming which is beyond the level 
predicted by any model should be used to represent a similarly unlikely case. He 
suggested a warming of 4°C on average, although more in the summer than the 
winter. This is equivalent to the level of warming UKCIP predicts by the 2080s, 
leading to temperatures similar to those found in southern France in the present day. 
 
So the project examined the effect on England of three scenarios for 2030: gradual 
warming by around 1°C, rapid warming by around 4°C, and collapse of the THC 
leading to net cooling of England by around 2°C. 
 
For the moderate warming scenario, the 2030 Low Warming projection by the UK 
Climate Impacts Programme (UK CIP) was used in the modelling. It predicts an 
average warming of 0.98°C, seasonally distributed as follows: 
 
Spring +0.83°C 
Summer +1.18°C 
Autumn +1.13°C 
Winter +0.77°C 
 
For the high warming scenario, a 4°C rise by 2030 is well above what UK CIP 
predicts. It is close to the 2080 High Warming projection by UK CIP, which was used 
in the modelling, with an average warming of 3.80°C, seasonally distributed as 
follows: 
 
Spring +3.23°C 
Summer +4.56°C 
Autumn +4.40°C 
Winter +3.00°C 
 
For the cooling scenario, Vellinga and Wood (2002) could not provide a regional 
temperature grid of the kind provided by UK CIP. Their model was much less 
geographically detailed. Wood (personal communication) states that there is only 
slightly more cooling in winter than in summer. Reductions in temperature ranging 
sinusoidally from 2.5°C in July to 3.5°C in January were overlaid on the 2020 Low 
Warming projection. The net cooling was 2.02°C, distributed seasonally as follows: 
 
Spring –2.02°C 
Summer –1.41°C 
Autumn –2.02°C 
Winter –2.64°C 
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Possible energy efficiency improvements 
 
The Energy White Paper (DTI 2003a) committed the government to put itself on a 
path to reduce the UK’s carbon dioxide emissions by 60% from 1990 levels by 2050 
(equivalent to 64MtC in 2050). It set an interim target of 105-115MtC in 2020 
(around 30% below 1990 levels). Following a linear path to the 2050 target of 10% 
each decade gives around 95MtC in 2030 (40% below 1990 levels). The Energy 
White Paper also sets the target that ‘as far as reasonably practical’ no household 
should be in fuel poverty by 2016. It is presumably intended that fuel poverty should 
not then increase after 2016. 
 
The official definition of a ‘satisfactory’ heating regime is 21°C in the living room, 
18°C in the other rooms - that is for 16 hours if people are in all day, 9 hours if 
everyone goes out to work or school, and only half the rooms if the home is 
considered underoccupied (DETR 2000). That is considered an ideal and the 
‘minimum’ heating regime (18°C and 16°C respectively) is regarded as a more 
appropriate target. The energy efficiency of homes in rated according to the Standard 
Assessment Procedure (SAP), a scale running from zero (extremely inefficient) to 120 
(extremely efficient). The average English home in 1996 had a SAP of around 46, 
although it had risen to 51 by 2001. The 1996 English House Condition Survey found 
that only at SAP 40 does average energy consumption of households meet the 
minimum heating regime and only at SAP 60 does average energy consumption of 
households meet the satisfactory heating regime. According to the official definition 
of satisfactory heating, over 80% of homes were insufficiently heated in 1996 and 
nearly half of homes were not even heated to the minimum standard (DETR 2000). 
 
The modelling undertaken for this project examined three different scenarios for 
household energy efficiency and calculated the effect on energy use using the model 
of the building stock developed and operated by the Environmental Change Institute 
at Oxford University. The three scenarios were one with maximum efficiency, a most 
likely scenario and one with minimum efficiency. 
 
The ECI model uses data from the national House Condition Surveys. This project 
used the part of the model that relates to England and relies on the 1996 English 
House Condition Survey. The ECI model uses the 12,131 homes in the physical 
sample to represent the entire English housing stock, with each home assigned a 
weighting factor to signify the number of dwellings it represents. The model 
calculates the expected energy consumption of the dwelling to achieve a particular 
level of heating and use of lighting and appliances set as desired (Sinden and Lane 
2004). The model used is being developed for the Tyndall Centre’s 40% House 
project, which is examining the prospects for reducing the carbon emissions from 
households to 40% of their 1990 levels by 2050. The characteristics of the homes 
existing in 1996 can be adjusted over time, adding insulation measures and changing 
the heating system. The model also constructs new homes to meet increases in 
number of households and demolishes old ones. The physical characteristics of the 
new houses are based on those of existing houses built between 1980 and 1996, 
except that the insulation standards and heating systems are set to meet the building 
regulations expected in the year that they are built. 
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In the 40% House project, scenarios based on the four Foresight scenarios have been 
developed to examine the changes that might occur by 2050. Those scenarios were 
not used here. Instead, scenarios were developed independently, except for the growth 
in household numbers, as revising that aspect of the existing model would have 
involved substantial additional work for ECI. For that aspect, the reference scenario 
derived from official projections and two of the variant scenarios were used. The ECI 
model only considers the physical aspects of the housing stock, not the economic 
aspects, and only outputs the energy and carbon consumption expected. It has no 
projection for future incomes or their distribution and no projections for future energy 
prices. It also does not (yet) consider the changes in the carbon content of electricity 
in future. These aspects of the scenarios are not just independently developed, but 
new and external to the ECI model. 
 
An important aspect in which this use of the model differs from the 40% House 
project is that there household temperatures are assumed to rise over time according 
to the trend expected in that scenario, whereas what was calculated in this project was 
the energy consumption, carbon emissions and costs based on an assumption of the 
standard heating regime (21°C in the living room and 18°C in other rooms). When 
looking at the results, it is important to remember that the results are not calculations 
about actual energy use, carbon emissions and costs, but those that would be the case 
if all homes followed the standard heating regime. 
 
It was decided not to assume the use of air conditioning to ameliorate high 
temperatures because could instead be criticised for obscuring the main aspect of the 
Government's targets for fuel poverty - meeting the target in terms of standards of 
warmth – and making it more difficult to achieve. It is unlikely that there will be a 
large uptake of air conditioning or other cooling technology in private homes by 2030, 
except in the rapid warming scenarios. In those scenarios, there could be a case for 
regarding cooling as a necessity, but to incorporate such an assumption into the 
calculations could have been accused of moving the goalposts in order to make 
achievement of the fuel poverty and carbon emissions reduction targets more difficult 
and so it was not done.  
 
After canvassing the advice of experts, it was thought most likely that improvements 
in future would be rather more rapid than those in the past because of the target for 
the elimination of fuel poverty and because of concern to reduce carbon emissions. 
However, it was possible that there would be a loss of interest in these issues in future 
years so that improvements would be closer to their historical level. On the optimistic 
side, combined with political commitment to promote insulation, more efficient 
heating systems and better building regulations, could lead to very significant 
improvements in efficiency and reductions in carbon emissions. In all the scenarios, it 
is assumed that central heating becomes universal (the standard heating regime cannot 
sensibly be met without it), whether it is based on gas, electricity or wood – other 
fuels such as coal and oil are no longer used for domestic heating in the scenarios for 
2030. 
 
The introduction of new technologies was considered in some of the scenarios. 
Domestic CHP (dCHP) and heat pumps are new technologies that are not yet in 
widespread use in Britain, although heat pumps are used in other countries. Both have 
higher capital costs than existing heating technologies, but are much more efficient. 
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dCHP is only as efficient at producing heat as a good conventional boiler, but it 
produces electricity which replaces electricity from the grid, overall reducing carbon 
dioxide and saving the household money. Unfortunately, dCHP technology is not 
likely to be suitable for use in every gas-heated home even by 2030. The technology 
which exists and is being commercialised is based on Stirling engines. They cannot 
efficiently be scaled below a certain size. A Stirling engine is only efficient in a home 
with a minimum annual thermal demand (space heating and hot water) of at least 
12,000 kWh per annum. In 1996, only 11% of gas-heated homes had a heating 
demand below this level (Crozier-Cole and Jones 2002), but with greater insulation by 
2030 the number of homes suitable for dCHP falls. Fuel cell technology would enable 
dCHP to work in smaller, better insulated homes, but it is unlikely to be 
commercialised before 2020-25 (Harrison 2002), too late to play any role in the 
scenarios here. 
 
Micro-CHP generates significantly less electricity than the total number of kilowatt 
hours that the homes uses in the year, but there are periods of time when the micro-
CHP unit is generating more electricity than is being consumed in the home. That 
surplus electricity is sold to the network. The simplest assumption is that it is sold at 
the same price as retail electricity, particularly because micro-CHP tends generate 
most at periods of high general electricity demand (because peak heating times are 
also times of peak use of electrical appliances).  
 
Jeremy Harrison of Powergen CHP (personal communication) recently informed us 
that in trials of micro-CHP, utilisation of the electricity generated has been about 60% 
to 85%. The value of electricity generated depends on when it is produced and what 
the marginal cost of generation is at that time. Their studies have found that the 
electricity is worth 2.5p/kWh to 3.5p/kWh. That is 3.25p/kWh to 4.25p/kWh less than 
the price of standard electricity. However, because the surplus electricity tends to be 
generated at peak times (usually when boilers come on in the morning and sometimes 
in the evening), utilities can also offer slightly lower prices for electricity taken from 
the grid because they will not need to provide as much electricity at expensive peak 
times. It was therefore assumed in the calculations that follow that 30% of the 
electricity generated by micro-CHP was surplus and sold to the network at 3.75p/kWh 
less than the prevailing price of standard rate electricity to the consumer. The effect of 
this change compared to an assumption of net metering was fairly marginal. 
 
The ECI model does not install dCHP with regard to the thermal demand, but simply 
a set proportion of the gas-heated homes in each category of housing. The ECI model 
is designed to give results for 2050 when fuel cell dCHP is likely to have been 
available for some time. The problem is that although in 1996 only 9% of gas-heated 
homes had a heat demand of less than the 12,000 kWh per annum taken to be the 
minimum for an efficient Stirling engine, in the maximum efficiency scenario about 
50% of homes have a thermal demand below this level. In order to more accurately 
assess the impact of dCHP and not overstate it, PSI therefore made further 
calculations to adjust the results from the output of the ECI model in order to allocate 
dCHP only to gas-heated homes that could efficiently use it and instead allocate 
condensing boilers to homes that could not. 
 
The scenario for maximum efficiency was set based on the assumption that 
government would undertake measures to ensure that the most efficient heating 
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technologies were adopted universally (dCHP for homes heated with gas and a 
thermal demand above 12,000 kWh, condensing boilers for homes heated with gas 
and a thermal demand below 12,000 kWh, heat pumps for houses with electric 
heating and wood-burning stoves for houses that presently use other fuels, mostly 
coal); insulation was increased to the maximum level in all homes; for new homes 
standards were progressively increased and solar power (both photovoltaic for 
electricity and thermal for hot water) would be mandatory for new homes from 2010. 
The scenario does not assume completely new technologies, but that the best 
performance from technologies now available is universal by 2030. After some 
consideration, it was decided to maintain the demolition rate at present levels. An 
allowance was made for an expected increase in electricity consumption by consumer 
electronics despite efficiency improvements as the amount of equipment increases 
very substantially. Conversely, it was assumed in this scenario that incandescent 
lighting would be entirely replaced by more efficient technologies such as compact 
fluorescents (CFL) and light-emitting diodes (LED). 
 
There are two main kinds of heat pumps: ground source heat pumps and air source 
heat pumps. The former are more efficient, but would not be practical in many homes 
presently with electric heating as a garden is needed to act as a ground source. The 
use of air source heat pumps was modelled, even though in reality some homes would 
have the better ground source heat pumps. An efficient air source heat pump currently 
costs a few thousand pounds, but they are cheaper in other countries and the price is 
expected to fall substantially. An air source heat pump would reduce electricity 
demand for heating by over 70% compared to conventional electric heating. 
 
Rates of loft insulation have remained stuck at around 90% for the last twenty years, 
although the thickness of the insulation in those homes that have it has gradually 
increased over time. In this scenario, it is assumed that all loft insulation is upgraded 
to the equivalent of 300mm of standard loft insulation (the level set by Building 
Regulations from 2005). Floor joists are usually only between 100mm and 150mm 
deep, but there are a number of options to increase the effective insulation above that 
level. Extra insulation can simply be laid over the joists, which is the cheapest and 
simplest option, but one which makes it difficult to safely walk about the loft and 
means that the loft cannot readily be used for storage because the weight of items on 
top of the insulation crushes it and prevents it from being effective. Another option 
which is slightly more expensive is to hang additional insulation in netting at the level 
of the rafters. The third option is to use more expensive but more efficient insulation 
that is twice as effective so that 150mm of this insulation is equivalent to 300mm of 
standard insulation – the cost of the material is about 50% greater than 300mm of 
standard insulation. The fourth option and most expensive option is to use solid 
decking insulation that can be fitted over the joists and with 100mm of mineral wool 
insulation between the joists achieves a u-value equivalent to 300mm of standard loft 
insulation. 
 
Cavity wall insulation is not suitable for all homes with cavity walls. It had been 
estimated that because of problems with rain penetration only 80% of cavities could 
be filled (Shorrock et al. 2002), but more recently there has been a change of opinion 
and it is now thought that about 95% of cavities can be filled (Shorrock, personal 
communication). In this scenario, it is assumed that the remaining 5% will instead be 
insulated with more expensive and inconvenient insulation that is normally applied to 
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solid walls. Cavity wall insulation brings the u-value of a cavity wall down from 
about 1.6 to 0.35 and internal or external wall insulation can achieve about the same. 
 
The most difficult aspect of the scenario to bring about would be ensuring that all 
solid-wall homes have wall insulation. Internal wall insulation (dry lining) of 6cm 
would typically reduce the u-value of a solid wall from 2.1 to 0.45. Since solid-wall 
dwellings are the most inefficient part of the building stock, achieving really 
substantial energy and carbon savings requires insulating their walls. The scenario 
assumes that such insulation would be heavily subsidised (or even free) to encourage 
households to add it when they would decorate the walls in a room. Such insulation 
typically costs £1000 per home. External wall insulation is more expensive, although 
slightly more effective, and there would probably be objections on aesthetic grounds 
if it was applied to some houses. 
 
The assumption of 100% take-up of these measures is somewhat utopian, but very 
high rates of uptake could be achieved if there was sufficient political will to improve 
efficiency standards for products and to actively ensure that heavily subsidised 
insulation measures were taken up. It is unlikely that solid wall insulation could be 
done on such a scale, but unless walls are insulated the heating demand from these 
homes will always be high. This scenario is designed to show the potential for 
improvements in energy efficiency by 2030. 
 
In this scenario, the issue of cost-effectiveness to the consumer has not been the 
criterion, but rather reducing energy consumption and carbon emissions as far as 
possible. Good loft insulation and cavity wall insulation are cost effective at present 
prices and with present energy prices at normal discount rates. Internal and external 
solid wall insulation have long payback times and are not currently considered cost-
effective in most cases. Micro CHP will be cost effective when it reaches the market. 
In Britain at present heat pumps are only cost-effective in some electrically-heated 
homes, because the capital cost is high – a few thousand pounds. However, heat 
pumps, particularly air-source heat pumps, are cheaper in other countries where there 
is a larger market because they can also be used for cooling. The running costs of a 
heat pump are similar to gas heating and the carbon dioxide emissions are 
significantly lower. Solar thermal is already cost-effective to install on a new roof, but 
solar photovoltaic is not. 
 
On the next page is a table of the main parameters of the maximum efficiency 
scenario: 
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Table 1: Maximum Efficiency Scenario –Key Model Parameters 
 
Parameters  Scenario 1 Scenario 1 Notes 
        
    
Demolition  
25,000pa across England in 
proportion to number of dwellings 
in each region 
 
        
Solid Walls   100% insulation to u=0.45 by 2030   
    
Cavity Walls   100% insulation to u=0.35 by 2030   
    
Solar PV   Uptake equals new build rate from 2010   
    
Solar Thermal   Uptake equals new build rate from 2010   
    
Space Heating   
dCHP in all gas homes 
>12,000kWhT; condensing boilers 
in all gas homes <12,000kWhT 
HP replacing all electricity 
dCHP 77% heat 15% 
electricity; condensing 
boilers 92% efficient 
HP 350% efficiency 
    
Doors   No change   
    
Double Glazing   100% installation to u=2.0 by 2030, linear increase   
    
Floors   No change   
    
Air Changes   Gradual improvement to 2030   
    
Loft Insulation   100% coverage of available to 300mm   
    
Electricity Demand  Lighting 20% of current 
  Cooking 100% of current 
  Consumer Electronics 200% of current 
  White Goods 100% of current 
    
Internal Temperatures 21C in living room and 18C in other rooms  
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The medium efficiency or ‘most likely’ scenario was the most difficult to construct. 
For technologies already in widespread use, it was decided to start from projecting 
forward to 2030 the curves of uptake rates shown by Shorrock et al. (2002) until 
saturation was reached, but making allowance for improvements in standards and 
additional uptake due to the planned increase in energy efficiency programmes in 
order to meet the fuel poverty target for 2016 and an expectation that they will 
continue because of concern about climate change. 
 
Following the curve suggests that by 2030 95% of windows will be double-glazed and 
100% will be draught-proofed. If ownership of cavity wall insulation follows the 
long-term curve since 1970 then by 2030 it will have reached 70%, although only 
55% if it follows the rate of the last decade. However, the Government has increased 
the funding for Warm Front and increased the size of the Energy Efficiency 
Commitment for 2005 to 2011. The two programmes are planning to insulate 4.4-5.7 
million of the 12 million cavities (about four million of which are already filled) over 
the next six years. Since it is now believed that 95% of cavities can be filled, it is 
reasonable to suppose that nearly all of those are likely to filled by 2030 unless there 
is a complete collapse in political will after 2011. To allow for some being missed, the 
rate of cavity wall insulation is set at 90% in this scenario. 
 
Ownership of loft insulation has remained stuck a little above 90% since the mid 
1980s and 40% have less than 100mm of insulation, but it is unlikely that this 
situation will be allowed to continue for the next 25 years. Loft insulation officially 
only has an effective life of 30 years and the insulation installed in the 1970s is now 
due for replacement. 
 
In the medium efficiency scenario it is assumed that after 2011 loft insulation will be 
subject to a big renewal effort as the installation of loft insulation was the first time in 
the period 1974-84 when government grants were available to all householders and as 
cavity wall insulation will be in 2005-11. Building regulations from 2005 will require 
the installation of 300mm of loft insulation in new buildings. Warm Front and the 
Energy Efficiency Commitment install loft insulation at the thickness set by building 
regulations unless the householder asks for less. As discussed above, there are 
practical difficulties with installing more loft insulation than the thickness of the 
joists, but there are ways to install the equivalent of 300mm of standard loft insulation 
that do not interfere with the loft being used for storage. It is assumed that those 
technologies will be used in order to bring lofts up to the standard set by building 
regulations. The additional cost should be justified because the old loft insulation will 
be losing its effectiveness and will need to be replaced anyway. It is assumed that in 
2030 90% of lofts will be insulated (more will have insulation down, but it will have 
become ineffective) and that those lofts with less than 200mm (the standard in 2000) 
will have been replaced with the equivalent of 300mm. 
 
Projecting forward the current rate of solid wall insulation, 10% could be expected by 
2030. Because external wall insulation is expensive and not very attractive, while 
internal wall insulation is inconvenient, it is assumed that there will not be a 
significant increase in the rate of uptake. 
 
It was difficult to decide what would be the likely uptake of new technologies - 
dCHP, heat pumps, solar PV and solar thermal – for which there is no historical 
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experience to draw on. A lot will depend on what happens to the costs of these 
technologies over the next 25 years. However, an analogy can be drawn with the 
experience with condensing boilers over the last 20 years. The capital cost of 
condensing boilers has not been very much greater than that of conventional boilers, 
but they account for only about 10% of the market because boilers are usually a 
distress purchase and people tend to buy cheaper ones or combi boilers to save space, 
without much regard to future energy costs. New efficiency standards for boilers 
mean that from 2005 nearly all boilers will be condensing, but dCHP is more 
complicated than condensing boilers, more difficult to install and not really 
economically worthwhile for small well-insulated homes, so it was considered 
unlikely that it will be incorporated in Building Regulations before 2030. After 
consultation with experts, it was decided that the most likely scenario is that dCHP 
will account for about 10% of gas-heated homes by 2030. It is assumed that heat 
pumps also have a slow uptake and account for only 10% of electric heating by 2030. 
Wood is assumed to replace coal and electricity to replace other fuels for heating. 
Solar thermal is included in regulations for new buildings from 2010, but because of 
its higher cost solar PV is not included before 2030. It is assumed that most lighting 
moves to low energy technologies, although demand increases, and electricity demand 
for lighting falls to 60% of its present level. 
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Table 2: ‘Most Likely’ Scenario –Key Model Parameters 
 
Parameters  Scenario 2 Scenario 2 Notes 
        
    
Demolition  
25,000pa across England in 
proportion to number of dwellings 
in each region 
 
        
Solid Walls   10% insulation to u=0.45 by 2030   
    
Cavity Walls   90% insulation to u=0.35 by 2030   
    
Solar PV   Negligible uptake   
    
Solar Thermal   Uptake equals new build rate from 2010   
    
Space Heating   
dCHP 10% of gas heated homes 
with >12,000kWhT by 2030; 
condensing boilers standard from 
2005; 
HP 10% of electrically heated 
homes by 2030 
dCHP 77% heat 15% 
electricity; condensing 
boilers 92% efficient 
HP 350% efficiency 
    
Doors   No change   
    
Double Glazing   95% installation to u=2.0 by 2030   
    
Floors   No change   
    
Air Changes   Gradual improvement to 2030   
    
Loft Insulation   
90% coverage of available. Lofts 
with less than 200mm increased to 
300mm. 
New lofts 200mm 1997-
2003; 300mm 2004-2030. 
3% of pre-1997 lofts 
upgraded to 300mm each 
year 2004-2030 
    
Electricity Demand  Lighting 60% of current 
  Cooking 100% of current 
  Consumer Electronics 200% of current 
  White Goods 100% of current 
    
Internal Temperatures 21C in living room and 18C in other rooms  
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The minimum efficiency scenario represents what would be likely to happen if the 
secular trend towards increasing energy efficiency continues, but the increases in 
energy efficiency programmes between 2005 and 2011 are ineffective, leading to a 
loss of political will and no extra resources beyond historical levels are committed 
after 2011. 
 
Since double glazing is driven primarily by factors other than concern about energy 
efficiency, there is no reason to suppose it would not continue to 95% coverage by 
2030 and that draught-proofing will not reach nearly 100%. The uptake of solid wall 
insulation is not currently subsidised and so it is likely to continue at the present fairly 
low rate in the absence of further government intervention. If the planned 
programmes to install cavity wall insulation are not as successful as expected and are 
not pursued later then uptake of cavity wall insulation may well return to trend and 
reach only 70% in 2030. Without new effort, loft insulation may remain effectively 
saturated at 90% and follow the trend in recent years that only 0.5% of lofts are 
upgrading each year and only to an average of 125mm of insulation (Shorrock and 
Utley 2003). In this scenario, slow uptake of low energy lighting continues to remain 
roughly balanced by increased use of lighting. A lack of improvement in efficiency 
standards leads to an increase in electricity demand for white goods and a greater 
increase in the electricity demand from consumer electronics. 
 
The change in regulations from 2005 will ensure that nearly all replacement boilers 
will be condensing boilers. Condensing boilers on the market presently range from 
82% to 92% efficient. In this scenario, it is assumed that there are no future 
improvements to regulations, so the condensing boilers in use will reflect the average 
efficiency of 87%. In the other two scenarios, it was assumed that by 2030 all boilers 
are 92% efficient. 
 
In this scenario, it is assumed that the uptake of dCHP and heat pumps is negligible. 
Neither solar PV nor solar thermal are taken up. Wood is assumed to replace coal and 
electricity to replace other fuels for heating. 
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Table 3: Minimum Efficiency Scenario –Key Model Parameters 
 
Parameters  Scenario 3 Scenario 3 Notes 
        
    
Demolition  
25,000pa across England in 
proportion to number of dwellings 
in each region 
 
        
Solid Walls   10% insulation to u=0.45 by 2030, linear increase   
    
Cavity Walls   70% insulation to u=0.35 by 2030   
    
Solar PV   No uptake   
    
Solar Thermal   No uptake   
    
Space Heating   No changes to standards after 2005 dCHP and HP negligible Boilers 87% efficient 
    
Doors   no change   
    
Double Glazing   95% installation by 2030  Double glazing installed 2004-2030 u=2.0 
    
Floors   No change   
    
Air Changes   Gradual improvement to 2030   
    
Loft Insulation   90% coverage. 
 0.5% p.a existing lofts 
upgraded to 125mm 
insulation 1997-2030. 
    
Electricity Demand  Lighting 100% of current 
  Cooking 100% of current 
  Consumer Electronics 300% of current 
  White Goods 150% of current 
    
Internal Temperatures 21C in living room and 18C in other rooms  
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Possible changes in incomes 
 
The first English House Condition Survey was undertaken in 1967. Over the years 
since then average indoor temperatures recorded have increased. That is because of a 
combination of factors. There have been improvements in home insulation and there 
has been a transition to the more efficient technology of central heating with North 
Sea gas. Total household energy consumption rose 27% between 1970 and 2000 (DTI 
2001). Real incomes have increased substantially in relation to fuel prices and so 
households have been able to afford to heat their homes more. 
 
The number of households in fuel poverty has fallen over time largely because real 
incomes have increased in relation to fuel prices. Most dramatically, the number of 
people in fuel poverty fell by 40% between 1996 and 2001 mainly as a result of lower 
fuel prices due to energy market liberalisation and higher incomes (DTI 2003b). 
 
What will happen to incomes is very important for determining what will happen to 
fuel poverty by 2030. Incomes will be determined both by the level of economic 
growth experienced and by what happens to levels of inequality. Three socio-
economic scenarios were created. It is common for scenarios to be based on the four 
Foresight scenarios (world markets, global sustainability, national enterprise and local 
stewardship), but this research follows different assumptions based around policies 
towards poverty and aimed at producing a best case and a worst case for the incomes 
of the poorest households in 2030, as well as a ‘most likely’ scenario. 
 
Advice was sought from Alan Marsh at the Policy Studies Institute, Steve McKay at 
Bristol University and Mike Brewer at the Institute for Fiscal Studies. All were 
extremely reluctant to make any prediction for what was likely to happen to income, 
inequality and the incomes of different kinds of households by 2030. One reason for 
this may well be that someone in 1978 predicting what would happen to inequality in 
the UK would probably have expected it to remain about where it was or to continue 
to decline, as it had been doing for several decades. In fact, the Gini coefficient (the 
standard international measure of inequality between households, where 0 is complete 
equality of income and 1 is one household having all the income) increased from 0.25 
to 0.34 between 1979 and 1990 (Shepherd 2003). The Gini coefficient stabilised 
under John Major and fell slightly in 1994-95, before starting to rise very slowly, a 
trend that continued under the Labour Government, peaking at 0.35 in 2000-01, 
before falling slightly (ibid). 
 
In 1999, the Prime Minister announced an aim to abolish child poverty by 2020, with 
poverty defined as living in a household with below 60% of median equivalent 
income. Equivalent income scales, such as the McClements equivalent income scale, 
take account of the fact that larger households need a higher income to have the same 
standard of living as smaller households. Abolishing child poverty according to this 
definition would be very difficult. However, the IFS think that the Government looks 
to be on track to reach its interim target of reducing the numbers of children in 
poverty from its 1997 level of 25% by a quarter in 2004-5 (Brewer 2004). The 
Government has a further target to reduce child poverty to half its 1997 level by 2010. 
This is more difficult (the further households are into poverty the more difficult it is to 
bring them out), but extension of tax credits to do so does not lead to a significant 
redirection of national income. However, the experts believe that eliminating child 
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poverty would be very demanding because bringing the very poorest families out of 
poverty would require very large expenditures and they are sceptical that the 
commitment will be stuck to until 2020. The lowest rates of child poverty in the 
OECD are in the Nordic countries, where it is 3 to 4% (UNICEF 2000). In the UK, 
the rate stood at 25% in 1996/7 and 21% in 2002/3 (DWP 2003), among the highest 
level in OECD countries. The general poverty rate is also 21% at present. 
 
As Alan Marsh (personal communication) pointed out, a problem with focusing 
exclusively on child poverty is that it can lead to a large difference between the 
standard of living enjoyed by a household with children and one without children 
where the parents otherwise earn the same. There is a danger of creating a perverse 
incentive to have children in order to escape poverty. Indeed, the creation of such 
large differentials led to the replacement of Working Families’ Tax Credit with 
Working Tax Credit (which those both with and without children are eligible for) and 
Child Tax Credit. 
 
In order to model incomes, household incomes were first updated from 1996 to 2004. 
The incomes reported in the 1996 English House Condition Survey, which is the 
dataset the ECI model is linked to, were compared with the inter-year statistics 
reported in the Office of National Statistics publication Households Below Average 
Income 1994/5-2003/03 (ONS 2004a). Its report on the distribution of income 
between households (not just those below average income) and how it has changed 
between years. There are tables based on statistics collected in the Family Resources 
Survey presenting the changes in income between the different years for different 
types of households. The population is divided into nine different types of 
households: pensioner couple, single male pensioner, single female pensioner, couple 
with children, couple without children, single with children, working age couple 
without children, single male working age no children, single female working age no 
children. The changes in median income are reported for each of these groups, for 
each quintile (fifth) of households adjusted according the McClements equivalent 
income scale and for households in each of the nine categories according to which 
quintile they are in. The changes in income are reported both before housing costs 
(BHC) and after housing costs (AHC). BHC income is more commonly used, but 
AHC incomes are of course generally lower. Housing makes up a disproportionately 
large percentage of the expenditure of many poor households, particularly in areas 
with high housing costs, so poverty rates AHC are higher than poverty rates BHC. 
Households Below Average Income also reports the poverty rates (percentage living 
on less than 60% of median equivalent income) for children, pensioners and the 
general population both in BHC and AHC terms. 
 
The incomes in the 1996 English House Condition Survey were updated from 1996 to 
2004 by using the Retail Prices Index deflator to allow for inflation and taking the 
relative changes to median income reported between 1994/5 and 2002/3 (as these 
were the closest years available) for each category of household and each quintile. It 
would have been desirable to update both BHC and AHC incomes so as to be able to 
calculate projected fuel poverty levels in 2030 both BHC and AHC, just as the 
English House Condition Survey reports fuel poverty both BHC and AHC, although 
the Government has decided to set its fuel poverty target in terms of income BHC. 
However, when the results from updating the incomes reported in the 1996 English 
House Condition Survey were cross-checked with the changes recorded in 
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Households Below Average Income (ONS 2004a), based on the much more reliable 
and detailed income data collected in the Family Resources Survey, it was found that 
although the changes in poverty levels for income BHC of these projections matched 
closely with the levels in the Family Resources Survey data, they did not for income 
AHC. The reason for this lay in the unreliability of the calculated income AHC based 
on the figures in the 1996 English House Condition Survey. The AHC income for 
many low-income households is very dependent on the values for housing benefit, 
which are unreliable in the English House Condition Survey. Indeed the survey’s 
electronic user guide says about the housing benefit figures: ‘use with caution – there 
is a lot of imputed data as data missing on rent, whether Housing Benefit and 
proportion of rent paid by HB.’ A number of approaches were tried to attempt to 
resolve this anomaly, but none were successful. It was decided that any projections of 
income AHC and hence fuel poverty AHC relying on the data given would be so 
unreliable as to be misleading. So only income BHC was projected to 2030 and only 
fuel poverty levels BHC in 2030 were calculated for the different scenarios. 
 
The general level of poverty BHC in 1994/5 was 18%, in 1996/7 it was also 18%, but 
in 2002/3 it was slightly lower at 17%. The general level of poverty AHC in 1994/5 
was 25%, in 1996/7 it was higher at 25%, but in 2002/3 it was lower at 22%. The 
level of child poverty BHC in 1994/5 was 23%, in 1996/7 it had risen to 25% and by 
2002/3 it had fallen to 21%. The level of child poverty AHC in 1994/5 was 32%, in 
1996/7 it had risen to 34% and by 2002/3 it had fallen to 29% (ONS 2004a). These 
falls were due to the increases in benefits and the tax credits, particularly for 
households with children. The levels of poverty and child poverty BHC that could be 
calculated from the income data in the 1996 English House Condition Survey closely 
matched the levels reported by ONS (2004a) from Family Resources Survey data. 
Incomes were projected forward from 1996 to 2004 by adjusting the incomes for each 
household by the median change in incomes between 1994/5 and 2002/3 reported in 
ONS (2004a) for households of the same quintile and the same type. The poverty rate 
and the child poverty rate projected forward closely matched the reported levels. 
 
The next stage was to project incomes forward from 2004 to 2010. The Government 
plans to reduce child poverty BHC to half its 1996/7 level by 2010. That means that 
by 2010 child poverty would be below 12.5%. A tax credit for children was modelled 
that would achieve this result. 
 
The income scenarios for 2030 were designed with three variables in mind. Firstly, 
the change in income distribution. Secondly, the rate of economic growth. Thirdly, the 
increase in the number of households. More households will form if there is higher 
economic growth, because increased wealth gives more potential households the 
income to form actual households and because higher economic growth also leads to 
higher rates of net immigration. The greater number of households somewhat offsets 
the increase in incomes. 
 
The first scenario devised reduced the level of inequality to around 0.25, its 1979 
level in the UK and its current level in the Nordic countries (World Bank 2002). It 
was decided to first model the effect of tax credits to reach the Government’s target to 
reduce child poverty to half its 1997 level by 2010, which lowered the Gini 
coefficient from 0.34 to 0.33, and then, because of the unfairness and perverse 
incentives that would apply if child poverty was largely eliminated but other forms of 
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poverty were not, to postulate for the subsequent years a general tax credit to reduce 
poverty levels in all kinds of households. The general tax credit was withdrawn at a 
rate of 18% on income above the poverty level and there was a marginal tax increase 
of 18% for incomes above the point the tax credit tapered off. This reduced the Gini 
coefficient to 0.25, the child poverty rate to 2.5% and the general poverty rate to 11%. 
The poorest 64% of households (those below the mean) were net gainers and the 
richest 36% of households (those above the mean) were losers. This scenario also 
assumes a fairly high average rate of economic growth of 2.8% over the next 26 
years. The economic scenarios were linked to projections for household numbers and 
hence the number of new dwellings built by 2030. Higher rates of economic growth 
were assumed to lead to higher rates of household formation and so larger household 
numbers as well. The number of households in England in 2030 is 25.40 million. 
 
The second scenario is the ‘most likely’ one. Because none of the experts would make 
a commitment as to what was most likely, it was decided to look at history. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, and again since the early 1990s, inequality remained fairly 
constant. In this context, the rapid rise experienced in the 1980s was an aberration. It 
was decided to model the effect of tax credits to reach the Government’s target to 
reduce child poverty to half its 1997 level by 2010, which lowered the Gini 
coefficient from 0.34 to 0.33 and then keep it constant. The child poverty rate 
remained at 12.5% and the general poverty rate was 15%. Growth in this scenario was 
around the long-term average for the UK, at 2.3%. The number of households in 
England in 2030 is 23.85 million. 
 
The third scenario instead postulated that present policies are kept to until 2010, 
lowering the Gini coefficient to 0.33, but then there is a significant change of policy 
and a repeat of the changes in incomes of different parts of the population that 
happened between 1979 and 1994, with little growth in income for the poorest 
households and the increased income from economic growth strongly skewed towards 
the richest households. The rate of child poverty increases to 28% and the general 
poverty rate to 24%. Following this pattern for the following twenty years to 2030 
takes the Gini coefficient from 0.33 to 0.42, the same as the Gini coefficient in the 
United States in the late 1990s (US Census Bureau 2000). Growth in this scenario was 
1.8%, the average growth rate experienced in the UK in the period 1979-95. The 
number of households in England in 2030 is 22.26 million. 
 
The number of households will also increase over time and the number of homes is 
assumed to increase to match the number of households. The ECI model built homes 
to do that in accordance with the kinds of dwellings built in 1991 to 1996. The 
calculations for increasing numbers of households were already in the ECI model 
based on the trends in official projections of household numbers to 2021 (DETR 
1999), but revised in light of the lower population numbers revealed by the 2001 
Census (ONS 2004b). It would have required reprogramming of the ECI model to use 
different estimates and a shortage of time for the ECI programmer meant that it was 
decided to use existing projections. The central projection was for 23.85 million 
households in England in 2030. The rate of household formation was also assumed to 
be higher than trend in the higher growth scenario and lower than trend in the lower 
growth scenario. There were 6.5% more households than trend in 2030 with high 
economic growth (25.40 million households) and 6.7% fewer households than trend 
with low economic growth (22.26 million households). These differences were taken 
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into account in the calculation of incomes. The incomes of households living in 
homes built after 1996 were calculated by matching them with the income projected 
to 2030 of the household living in the most similar existing home in terms of region, 
type of dwelling, tenure and floor area. 
 
There will be other demographic changes by 2030, but it was decided that attempting 
to explicitly incorporate them into the model would confuse matters. The proportions 
of pensioners and single adults are expected to increase and the proportion of couples 
with children is expected to decrease. The difficulty in adjusting incomes to allow for 
the changes in the proportions of the different kinds of households to improve the 
accuracy of the projections is that those households would have to be matched to 
dwellings and the kind of households that will live in particular dwellings by 2030 
will also have changed. What is unlikely to change much is the relative ranking of the 
incomes of households that live in particular types of dwellings since that is largely 
what determines what kind of home households can afford. 
 
The total national household income in the high income scenario is 13.5% higher than 
in the medium income scenario and the total national household income in the low 
income scenario is 12.0% lower than in the medium income scenario (1.135 and 0.880 
are almost exactly reciprocal). But because the number of households is 6.5% higher 
than the central projection in the high income scenario and 6.7% lower than the 
central projection in the low income scenario, the average income of households in 
the high income scenario is only 6.6% higher than in the medium income scenario and 
the average income of households in the low income scenario is only 5.7% lower than 
in the medium income scenario. The way in which the different income scenarios 
really vary is in the income distribution. The median income of the bottom quintile 
(the poorest 20% of households) in the low income (and increased inequality) 
scenario is 12.8% lower than in the medium income scenario. The difference is even 
bigger in the high income (and decreased inequality) scenario. The median income of 
the bottom quintile in the high income scenario is 36.6% higher than in the medium 
income scenario. The reason why the difference in the incomes of the poorest from 
the medium incomes scenario is so much greater in this scenario than in the low 
income scenario is because in the low income scenario there has simply been a bias 
for added income for economic growth to go to the rich, whereas in the high income 
scenario the poorest households have been targeted for the most assistance through 
tax credits. The effect of this will be seen in the results section. 
 
Possible changes in energy prices 
 
Around 80% of British homes are now heated by North Sea gas. North Sea gas is also 
the primary fuel for electricity production. Yet it will be largely exhausted in a couple 
of decades’ time. Britain is likely to become increasingly dependent on gas from 
Russia and the Middle East (Strategy Unit 2002), which have three-quarters of proven 
world reserves. Indeed, 58% of the world’s reserves of natural gas lie in just three 
countries, Russia, Iran and Qatar (Energy Information Administration 2004). The 
Energy White Paper (DTI 2003a) was relaxed about the implications of natural gas 
providing not just most of our heating, but an increasingly dominant proportion of our 
electricity as well. 
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The scenarios in this area drew in particular on the results of models presented in two 
publications, the World Energy, Technology and Climate Policy Outlook 2030 
(European Commission 2003), the report of a European research project known as 
WETO, and Options for a Low Carbon Future (DTI 2003c), a report for the DTI’s 
preparation of the Energy White Paper. Both these reports contained projections of 
future energy costs under different scenarios. 
 
The WETO report looked at likely and possible changes to the price of gas on the 
European market as part of a much broader analysis of the trajectory of the global 
energy system. They assumed a largely ‘business as usual’ development of world 
energy demand to 2030. Global demand is double its 1990 level by 2030 and carbon 
constraints are not observed. The US increases its carbon dioxide emissions by 50% 
from 1990 levels and the EU by 18%. The predictions for energy reserves are based 
on US Geological Survey (2000) estimates, which have been criticised as possibly 
over-optimistic. The WETO report also gives 5% and 95% confidence limits for oil 
and gas reserves. It predicts that by 2030, North Sea gas reserves will be exhausted. 
Norway will produce gas in the Norwegian Sea, but the largest share of Europe’s gas 
will come from Russia. Russia and the Persian Gulf region between them have 68% 
of the world’s existing gas reserves. In 2030, Russian gas will be supplemented with 
pipeline gas from Norway, Algeria and Libya and some from the Persian Gulf 
(through Turkey). Liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the Persian Gulf and Nigeria will 
also be used. 
 
A detailed assessment of world hydrocarbon reserves (International Energy Agency 
2001) pointed out that existing fields in western Siberia, the mainstay of Russian 
production, are declining rapidly. The International Energy Agency expressed some 
concern about the future of Russian gas production. Russia has other gas reserves that 
have not yet been developed outside western Siberia. There are reserves in the Arctic 
under the Yamal Peninsula (which juts north into the Kara Sea east of Novaya 
Zemlya) and some in the Barents Sea, although both would be expensive to develop 
and are not expected on stream before 2015. Gas from the Persian Gulf would 
actually be cheaper on the European market, despite the additional distance. There are 
also reserves around Astrakhan. It is believed that Russia has large undiscovered 
reserves of gas elsewhere. Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union 
have 58 trillion cubic metres (tcm) of proven reserves and an estimated 44 tcm of 
undiscovered reserves (International Energy Agency 2001). 
 
The Persian Gulf area is the other part of the world with really large gas reserves. It 
has 58.5 tcm of proven reserves and it is believed to have 115-136 tcm of ultimate 
reserves (International Energy Agency 2001). Because of its distance from major gas 
markets, gas production there has been low in relation to the size of reserves and it 
will still be providing gas long after Russia’s resources are depleted. 
 
World gas reserves are more widely dispersed than world reserves of conventional. 
The major difference is that rather than being concentrated in the Middle East, like oil 
reserves, gas reserves are concentrated in the Middle East and Russia. It has been 
argued that a cartel would be unable to drive up the price of natural gas as OPEC in 
the past did with oil, because Russian gas could be obtained instead. However, this 
seems to overlook the possibility that Russia and the OPEC nations could get together 
to form a cartel. 
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There has been discussion recently about ‘peak oil’, the heretical (in the energy 
industry) theory that oil production will peak between 2005 and 2010. The USGS 
instead predicts that oil production will continue to increase until after 2035. 
Supporters of the ‘peak oil’ theory argue that officially-stated oil reserves have been 
overestimated by OPEC members to boost their production quotas (which are based 
on their stated oil reserves) and outside OPEC by private oil companies to boost their 
share price. They point out that globally oil discoveries peaked in the early 1960s and 
the fields discovered then should be expected to start to decline, just as oil discoveries 
in the United States peaked in 1930 and oil production peaked in 1972. Oil extraction 
has been greater than oil discovery every year since 1980 (Aleklett and Campbell 
2003). Their critics argue that extraction techniques are continually improving, 
meaning that more oil is being extracted from old discoveries and that non-
conventional sources of oil, such as the oil shale found in western Canada and the tar 
sands in eastern Venezuela, will be used increasingly as conventional oil runs out. 
‘Peak oil’ proponents respond that revising estimates for recoverable reserves because 
of the ability to extract a higher proportion of oil from a field is not really a new 
discovery and treating it that way disguises the decline in actual discoveries over the 
years. They also express scepticism about large-scale extraction of oil from oil shale 
and tar sands as they would require enormous amounts of energy and water. 
 
Although ‘peak oil’ proponents claim that gas reserves have also been overestimated, 
they believe that ‘peak gas’ will come much later, about 2030 (Laherrere 2004). 
However, because gas can substitute for oil in many cases, if ‘peak oil’ is correct, the 
price of gas will rise significantly in future. 
 
The gas price fluctuates in response to the oil price, although not as much, and unlike 
oil prices, gas prices vary significantly between different regions of the world as gas 
is not as readily transported. The WETO report’s projections for the prices of oil and 
gas in 2004 were €20 ($24) per barrel of oil and on the European market €13 ($16) 
per barrel of oil equivalent of gas. That price of gas translates to 15p/therm. The 
actual price of oil at the time of writing (September 2004) is about $45 a barrel and 
the price of October gas (the benchmark) is about 32p/therm. However, oil prices are 
50% above their level a year ago and gas prices are 40% above their level a year ago. 
Only five years ago, the price of oil was $10 a barrel. This shows how volatile the 
prices of oil and gas are in the short term and how unreliable predictions are. 
 
The WETO report gives three predictions for the prices of oil and gas in 2030. One is 
a central prediction, based on the USGS estimates for ultimately recoverable 
resources of oil and gas globally. It also gives price predictions based on a low 
estimate and a high estimate (supposedly within 95% confidence intervals) for 
ultimately recoverable resources of oil and gas. In the low case, oil resources are only 
79% of the USGS central estimate and gas resources are only 74% of the USGS 
central estimate. In the high case, oil resources are135% of the USGS central estimate 
and gas resources are 144% of the USGS central estimate. 
 
The WETO report predicts that in the central case, the price of oil in 2030 will be €35 
($42) per barrel and the price of gas on the European market will be €28 ($34) per 
barrel of oil equivalent, which works out at 32p/therm. As noted above, oil and gas 
are at that level in 2004. In the low resources (high price) case, the price of oil will be 
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€42 ($50) per barrel and the price of gas will be €36 ($43) per barrel of oil equivalent, 
which works out at 41p/therm. In the high resources (low price) case, they do not use 
the high oil resources estimate, substituting the central estimate for reasons that are 
not explained, but they predict that the price of gas on the European market will be 
€20 ($24) per barrel of oil equivalent, which works out at 23p/therm. 
 
These predictions imply that the price of energy in 2030 is unlikely to be much higher 
than it is now. These figures are the only recent prediction of prices in 2030 available 
that looks at reserves and applies a model of the energy market to them, so they have 
been treated as the most widely accepted estimates available, despite criticism that 
they are over-optimistic because they rely on USGS estimates which hold that neither 
oil nor gas are in short supply. 
 
World gas production is currently about 100 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per annum (or 16 
billion barrels of oil equivalent). Laherrere (2004) translates WETO’s central estimate 
for world gas production in 2030 as 190 Tcf per annum (or 30 billion barrels of oil 
equivalent) and still rising rapidly. His estimate, based on following a Hubbert curve 
extrapolating a curve from historical gas production data and where gas production 
peaks about sixty years after gas discoveries peaked, is that world gas production will 
peak around 2030 at 140 Tcf (22 billion barrels of oil equivalent). Laherrere predicts 
that gas production from Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union will peak 
around 2015, while gas production from the Middle East will peak between 2030 and 
2040. 
 
The 140 Tcf estimate is only slightly lower than WETO’s low reserves estimate for 
gas, but even WETO’s low estimate for oil reserves assumes that oil is substantially 
more abundant than the supporters of the ‘peak oil’ theory hold. The USGS holds that 
there are about 3 trillion barrels of oil left and oil production will not peak until the 
2030s, and at minimum about 2.4 trillion barrels of oil left; the ‘peak oil’ school of 
thought holds that there are less than 1 trillion barrels of oil left. Following a Hubbert 
curve for oil that peaks in 2010 at about 27 billion barrels of oil per annum, oil 
production would fall to about 15 billion barrels of oil per annum by 2030 (Aleklett 
and Campbell 2003) while gas production would be at 22 billion barrels of oil 
equivalent in 2030 (Laherrere 2004). Following WETO estimates, however, world oil 
production will increase to about 44 billion barrels of oil per annum in 2030 while gas 
production will be about 30 billion barrels of oil equivalent. 
 
That means that production of the two forms of energy together is 74 billion barrels of 
oil equivalent in the WETO scenario and 37 billion barrels of oil equivalent in 
Campbell and Laherrere’s scenario. Given that energy demand in the long term is 
highly elastic to price - as DTI (2003c) assumes in their calculations. If Laherrere is 
correct in his analysis of the true availability of oil and gas and it is assumed that gas 
cannot substitute for oil then oil prices in 2030 would be about three times as high as 
they are in WETO’s central projections at €103 ($123) per barrel of oil, while prices 
for gas would be only 35% higher at €38 ($46) per barrel of oil equivalent, or 
43p/therm. However, gas can be substituted for oil for many uses and inevitably that 
would happen as far as possible if oil production were to fall 40% by 2030 and the 
price was to rise very substantially. Since about 50% of the oil used in the world is for 
transport, for which it would be impractical to rapidly substitute natural gas for oil, 
that would mean that other uses of oil would have to decrease very dramatically, 
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which would be more difficult for countries that are currently very dependent on oil 
and far from supplies of natural gas. However, the development of liquid natural gas 
(LNG) tanker ships is anyway taking such countries (for example in East Asia) in the 
direction of greater use of natural gas. Simple substitution would imply that the price 
of both oil and natural gas would be around twice what it is now, giving a price of oil 
of €70 ($84) per barrel and a price of gas of €56 ($67) per barrel of oil equivalent, or 
64p/therm. It was assumed that some substitution would take place and the prices 
would be about halfway between the two extremes, reflecting the fact that about half 
of world oil consumption is for transport purposes, where substitution with natural gas 
is much more difficult than for stationary uses. The price of oil would therefore be 
about €86 ($103) per barrel and the price of gas would be about €47 ($56) per barrel 
of oil equivalent, or 53p/therm. It was decided to use these very rough estimates, 
rather than WETO’s ‘high price’ scenario, for the high energy price scenario in order 
to better reflect the genuine uncertainty. 
 
To translate these prices into estimates for British consumer energy prices in 2030, it 
is necessary to turn to the predictions in DTI (2003c). The domestic price to the 
consumer in 2000 was 50.0p/therm, while the industrial price was 21.5p/therm and 
the price to the electricity supply industry was 23.0p/therm. In their predictions of 
future prices to 2050, the absolute differences between these prices remains constant. 
In the baseline scenario they predict the price will rise 6.7p/therm from 2000 levels by 
2030. This is lower than the WETO central prediction, but it is arrived at by different 
and even less reliable means, looking only at demand and ignoring supply, although 
their baseline prediction for 2040 and their Global Sustainability prediction for 2030 
(10p/therm above 2000 levels) almost exactly match the WETO central prediction for 
2030. WETO’s low prediction for 2030 is only slightly higher than actual 2000 prices. 
We can calculate that the central estimate for the price of gas to the British consumer 
in 2030 is 60p/therm, or 2.05p/kWh. The low estimate is 51p/therm, or 1.74p/kWh. 
The high estimate is 81p/therm, or 2.76p/kWh. In all the calculations, standing 
charges were not included as they unnecessarily complicate matters, increasing bills 
for low users and decreasing bills for high users. 
 
The MARKAL model estimates that the combined cost of electricity for industrial 
users in 2020 with the EU emissions trading scheme and meeting the 20% renewables 
target for that year is equivalent to the cost of electricity meeting a 20% carbon 
dioxide reduction target and stands at £12.10/GJ or 5.11p/kWh, compared to 
4.36p/kWh for the baseline scenario and rises to £12.70/GJ or 5.36p/kWh in 2050 
(DTI 2003c). MARKAL estimates the cost of electricity in 2020 with a 30% reduction 
in carbon dioxide emissions is 5.94p/kWh, but the cost to achieve that result in 2030 
would be lower because technology would have moved on – the price is only very 
slightly higher at 6.01p/kWh for a 60% reduction in 2050. The price of electricity for 
industrial users in 2003 was 3.10p/kWh and for domestic users it was 6.75p/kWh 
(DTI 2004). In the absence of a figure for the baseline cost of electricity in 2030, the 
most reasonable baseline figure to use for 2030 seems to be an interpolation between 
the cost in 2020 including emissions trading and the renewables obligation 
(5.11p/kWh for industrial users) and the cost in 2050 with no additional constraints 
(5.36p/kWh for industrial users). That would be 5.19p/kWh for industrial electricity 
and 8.84p/kWh for standard rate domestic electricity. 
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However, the baseline cost of gas in 2030 in MARKAL is 3.3p/therm (or 0.11p/kWh) 
lower than assumed here. Combined cycle gas turbines are projected to be 68% 
efficient in 2030. Since gas accounts for 85% of electricity production in 2030 in the 
baseline model, the industrial price of electricity in our baseline scenario would be 
0.14p/kWh higher at 5.50p/kWh and the price for standard rate domestic electricity 
would be 9.15p/kWh. 
 
A higher gas price would make electricity from gas even more expensive and in the 
high energy cost scenario the cost of electricity from gas would be 0.89p/kWh higher, 
but since in MARKAL electricity from gas costs about 2.1-2.3p/kWh to generate in 
2030 and other kinds of electricity cost 2.5p/kWh to 3.5p/kWh to generate, an 
increase of that magnitude could make gas less competitive for electricity and other 
technologies costing on average only 3p/kWh would predominate, according to 
MARKAL. In reality, some substitution would take place, but the costs of renewable 
energy increase as a larger proportion of demand is met from it as there needs to be a 
larger and larger amount of conventional generation as back-up for when intermittent 
renewables fail to generate enough electricity and the reintroduction of coal seems 
unlikely because of the carbon emissions impact. As a worst case, it is assumed that 
electricity would be 0.89p/kWh more expensive than in the middle price scenario and 
the cost of industrial electricity would be 6.39p/kWh and standard rate domestic 
electricity would be 10.04p/kWh. 
 
Conversely, if the price of gas was lower, no more gas would be used than in the 
baseline scenario as the non-gas electricity production is entirely a consequence of the 
renewables obligation and Sizewell B remaining in operation. In the low energy price 
scenario, the cost of industrial electricity would be about 0.39p/kWh cheaper than in 
our middle price scenario at 5.11p/kWh and 8.76p/kWh for domestic electricity. 
 
These figures are for standard rate electricity. In 1996, 2.5% of households used 
standard rate electricity for heating and 8.4% used off-peak electricity for heating 
(DETR 2000), so 77% of the 10.9% that were electrically heated used off-peak 
electricity for heating. Among electrically heated households, being on an off-peak 
electricity tariff strongly correlates with greater use, so off-peak electricity’s 
proportion of the electricity used for heating is higher, but difficult to quantify due to 
limitations in the data. At present, off-peak electricity costs around 2.70p/kWh. 
Assuming 90% of electricity for heating is off-peak and 10% peak, that gives an 
average price of about 3.10p/kWh - the same as industrial users pay. It is assumed that 
off-peak electricity will continue to be provided and the average cost of electricity for 
heating is the same price as industrial electricity – 5.11p/kWh in the low cost 
scenario, 5.50p/kWh in the baseline scenario and 6.39p/kWh in the high cost scenario. 
Where homes have heat pumps by 2030, it is assumed that the electricity running 
them is standard rate as heat pumps cannot efficiently run storage heaters. 
 
The price of wood was the same in all three scenarios, the present price of 2.5p/kWh 
for bagged wood pellets. 
 
Different climate change scenarios would also have an effect on price. In a world with 
only moderate warming (1°C by 2030) the effect of climate change on energy prices 
would be modest. If the THC closed down, temperatures in north-west Europe would 
be about 2°C cooler than in 1960-1990, but temperatures globally would only fall 
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back by 1°C to their 1960-1990 levels. Since by 2030 gas will be a rather globalised 
commodity, the effect would be similarly modest. If there was rapid warming by 4°C 
globally, that would be 3°C warmer than the most likely level of warming and reduce 
the demand for heating. The effect on the price of gas is difficult to determine, 
because to calculate it would require information about the effect on heat demand at a 
global level. It is also likely that gas will be used for an increasingly wide variety of 
purposes as well as heating. After examination, it was decided that the effect would 
probably be small compared to the large variations already allowed for. 
 
The same objection could be made about the interaction between other dimensions of 
the scenarios. The philosophy underlying this research has always been to make the 
scenarios independent. There are two reasons for that. The first is that if the scenarios 
are adjusted before they go into the model then the way that different factors affect 
the results that come out is obscured and they would become difficult to understand. 
The second is that individually crafting 81 scenarios would be an unreasonable 
amount of effort in such a small project, particularly in one that was also limited in its 
access to the ECI computer model and the time of their programmer. 
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Table 4: Cooling Scenarios 
 
 Energy 
Efficiency 
Growth/ 
Distribution 
Energy 
price 
CO2 
emissions 
(million 
tonnes) 
% change  
emissions 
since 1990
£ Billion 
domestic 
energy 
Fuel poor 
households 
 
% fuel poor 
households 
1 High High High  83.47 -33.2 21.58 125,000 0.5 
2 High High Medium  83.47 -33.2 18.46 50,000 0.2 
3 High High Low 83.47 -33.2 17.09 25,000 0.1 
4 High Medium High  79.02 -36.8 20.38 825,000 3.4 
5 High Medium Medium  79.02 -36.8 17.42 475,000 2.0 
6 High Medium Low 79.02 -36.8 16.13 350,000 1.5 
7 High Low High  76.09 -39.1 19.44 1,650,000 7.4 
8 High Low Medium  76.09 -39.1 16.59 1,200,000 5.3 
9 High Low Low 76.09 -39.1 15.35 1,000,000 4.5 
10 Medium High High  124.09 -0.7 27.39 725,000 2.9 
11 Medium High Medium  124.09 -0.7 22.75 350,000 1.4 
12 Medium High Low 124.09 -0.7 20.72 225,000 0.9 
13 Medium Medium High  121.91 -2.5 26.63 1,800,000 7.6 
14 Medium Medium Medium  121.91 -2.5 22.07 1,100,000 4.6 
15 Medium Medium Low 121.91 -2.5 20.08 850,000 3.6 
16 Medium Low High  115.93 -7.3 25.22 2,750,000 12.3 
17 Medium Low Medium  115.93 -7.3 20.88 1,900,000 8.5 
18 Medium Low Low 115.93 -7.3 18.99 1,600,000 7.2 
19 Low High High  144.18 +15.3 32.73 1,250,000 4.9 
20 Low High Medium  144.18 +15.3 27.34 625,000 2.4 
21 Low High Low 144.18 +15.3 24.98 400,000 1.6 
22 Low Medium High  139.74 +11.8 31.47 2,600,000 10.8 
23 Low Medium Medium  139.74 +11.8 26.25 1,700,000 7.1 
24 Low Medium Low 139.74 +11.8 23.96 1,350,000 5.6 
25 Low Low High  133.60 +6.9 29.91 3,800,000 17.0 
26 Low Low Medium  133.60 +6.9 24.92 2,700,000 12.1 
27 Low Low Low 133.60 +6.9 22.73 2,250,000 10.2 
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Figure 1: CO2 emissions (million tonnes) in cooling scenarios 
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Figure 2: Percentage of fuel poor households in cooling scenarios 
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Table 5: Moderate Warming Scenarios 
 
 Energy 
Efficiency 
Growth/ 
Distribution 
Energy 
price 
CO2 
emissions 
(million 
tonnes) 
% change  
emissions 
since 1990
£ Billion 
domestic
energy 
Fuel poor 
households 
 
% fuel 
poor  
households
1 High High High  68.78 -45.0 19.14 50,000 0.2 
2 High High Medium  68.78 -45.0 16.57 <25,000 <0.1 
3 High High Low 68.78 -45.0 15.44 <25,000 <0.1 
4 High Medium High  65.07 -47.9 18.06 525,000 2.2 
5 High Medium Medium  65.07 -47.9 15.62 300,000 1.3 
6 High Medium Low 65.07 -47.9 14.56 250,000 1.0 
7 High Low High  62.32 -50.1 17.17 1,275,000 5.7 
8 High Low Medium  62.32 -50.1 14.84 950,000 4.3 
9 High Low Low 62.32 -50.1 13.82 825,000 3.7 
10 Medium High High  96.95 -22.4 22.87 300,000 1.2 
11 Medium High Medium  96.95 -22.4 19.24 125,000 0.5 
12 Medium High Low 96.95 -22.4 17.66 75,000 0.3 
13 Medium Medium High  94.67 -24.3 22.09 1,075,000 4.5 
14 Medium Medium Medium  94.67 -24.3 18.55 650,000 2.7 
15 Medium Medium Low 94.67 -24.3 17.00 500,000 2.0 
16 Medium Low High  89.92 -28.1 20.89 1,925,000 8.6 
17 Medium Low Medium  89.92 -28.1 17.52 1,575,000 6.2 
18 Medium Low Low 89.92 -28.1 16.05 1,325,000 5.3 
19 Low High High  115.19 -7.8 27.93 625,000 2.4 
20 Low High Medium  115.19 -7.8 23.62 275,000 1.1 
21 Low High Low 115.19 -7.8 21.73 175,000 0.7 
22 Low Medium High  111.19 -11.0 26.74 1,725,000 7.3 
23 Low Medium Medium  111.19 -11.0 22.58 1,125,000 4.7 
24 Low Medium Low 111.19 -11.0 20.76 850,000 3.6 
25 Low Low High  106.03 -15.2 25.35 3,525,000 15.9 
26 Low Low Medium  106.03 -15.2 21.38 2,350,000 10.5 
27 Low Low Low 106.03 -15.2 19.65 1,850,000 8.3 
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Figure 3: CO2 emissions (million tonnes) in moderate warming scenarios 
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Figure 4: Percentage of fuel poor households in moderate warming scenarios 
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Table 6: High Warming Scenarios 
 
 Energy 
Efficiency 
Growth/ 
Distribution 
Energy  
price 
CO2 
emissions 
(million 
tonnes) 
% change  
emissions 
since 1990
£ Billion 
domestic  
energy 
Fuel poor 
households 
 
% fuel 
poor  
households
1 High High High  59.23 -52.6 17.46 <25,000 <0.1 
2 High High Medium  59.23 -52.6 15.24 <25,000 <0.1 
3 High High Low 59.23 -52.6 14.27 <25,000 <0.1 
4 High Medium High  55.98 -55.2 16.47 350,000 1.5 
5 High Medium Medium  55.98 -55.2 14.37 225,000 1.0 
6 High Medium Low 55.98 -55.2 13.46 175,000 0.8 
7 High Low High  53.31 -57.4 15.59 1,050,000 4.7 
8 High Low Medium  53.31 -57.4 13.59 775,000 3.5 
9 High Low Low 53.31 -57.4 12.72 700,000 3.2 
10 Medium High High  78.67 -37.1 19.83 125,000 0.5 
11 Medium High Medium  78.67 -37.1 16.89 50,000 0.2 
12 Medium High Low 78.67 -37.1 15.57 25,000 0.1 
13 Medium Medium High  76.29 -39.0 19.04 675,000 2.8 
14 Medium Medium Medium  76.29 -39.0 16.18 400,000 1.6 
15 Medium Medium Low 76.29 -39.0 14.93 300,000 1.3 
16 Medium Low High  72.32 -42.1 17.96 1,450,000 6.5 
17 Medium Low Medium  72.32 -42.1 15.26 1,050,000 4.7 
18 Medium Low Low 72.32 -42.1 14.07 900,000 4.0 
19 Low High High  95.76 -23.4 24.71 300,000 1.2 
20 Low High Medium  95.76 -23.4 21.12 125,000 0.5 
21 Low High Low 95.76 -23.4 19.56 75,000 0.3 
22 Low Medium High  91.98 -26.4 23.56 1,200,000 5.1 
23 Low Medium Medium  91.98 -26.4 20.12 750,000 3.2 
24 Low Medium Low 91.98 -26.4 18.61 575,000 2.4 
25 Low Low High  87.44 -30.0 22.27 2,175,000 9.8 
26 Low Low Medium  87.44 -30.0 19.00 1,550,000 6.9 
27 Low Low Low 87.44 -30.0 17.57 1,350,000 6.0 
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Figure 5: CO2 emissions (million tonnes) in high warming scenarios 
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Figure 6: Percentage of fuel poor households in high warming scenarios 
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Results 
 
The results of the 81 scenarios are presented here in three large tables, one table for 
each set of climate scenarios. Table 4 presents the cooling scenarios and Figures 1 and 
2 provide graphical representations. Table 5 presents the moderate warming scenarios 
and Figures 3 and 4 provide graphical representations. Table 6 presents the high 
warming scenarios and Figures 5 and 6 provide graphical representations. Numbers 
have been rounded and the estimates for the numbers of households in fuel poverty 
have been rounded to the nearest 25,000 (about 0.1% of households). 
 
It is important to note that the emissions given are not predictions of actual emissions 
under the scenarios, but of the emissions that would occur if all homes were heated to 
exactly the standard heating regime. 
 
There is a huge amount of variation between the different scenarios. Emissions range 
from 53.31 million tonnes of carbon dioxide, a reduction of 57.4% from 1990 levels 
of 125 million tonnes, and an expenditure on domestic energy of £12.72 billion per 
annum up to emissions of 144.18 million tonnes of carbon dioxide, an increase of 
15.3% from 1990 levels, and an expenditure of £32.73 billion per annum. The 
numbers of households in fuel poverty range from a few thousand households to 3.8 
million households, more than twice the 1.7 million in 2001. The possibility space is 
enormous. 
 
The reason for the reduction in carbon emissions in most of the scenarios is not 
simply because of increased efficiency in the use of energy, it is also because of less 
carbon-intensive electricity production. With the complete phasing out of coal for 
electricity production by 2030, a shift to very efficient combined cycle gas turbines 
and an expansion of renewable energy to take much of the place of nuclear power, 
carbon dioxide emissions per kilowatt-hour have fallen from 0.43kg/kWh now to just 
0.24kg/kWh in 2030. Indeed, it is the fall in the carbon intensity of electricity 
production that accounts for the large reductions in carbon emissions. If the carbon 
intensity of electricity production had remained the same as it is now, carbon 
emissions in all the scenarios would be about 20% higher in relation to 1990 levels. 
 
Of course, not all the scenarios are equally likely. Scenarios closer to the central one 
are generally more likely than scenarios further away. Scenarios which involve a 
combination of extreme scenarios are particularly unlikely. The purpose of this 
project is not to predict what will happen, but to create a wide range of scenarios of 
what might happen, some of them very improbable, in order to explore the possibility 
space and the relative significance of the variations in the different dimensions that 
influence fuel poverty. 
 
It is worth noting first that the central scenario, the one which is most likely of the 81, 
with moderate warming, medium efficiency improvements, medium growth and little 
change in income distribution, and medium energy prices shows a decrease in 
emissions compared to 2001 levels of 24% or about 30.5 million tonnes of carbon 
dioxide, far short of the interim target of a 40% reduction by 2030, and a 62% 
decrease in fuel poverty from 1.7 million households in 2001 to 650,000 households 
(2.7%), a very long way short of the target of abolition by 2016. Consumer energy 
prices have risen significantly in this scenario, but even in the relatively low cost 
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scenario where gas costs only about the same as it cost in 2000 and electricity prices 
have risen by ‘only’ 2.01p/kWh, fuel poverty has only fallen to 500,000 households 
(2.0%), about 71% down on 2001 levels, but still quite a long way short of abolition. 
It seems that policies for achieving the target of the abolition of fuel poverty may rest 
on the assumption that energy prices are not going to rise. 
 
The rise in electricity prices used in the scenarios based on the projections by DTI 
(2003c) plays the main role in the relatively poor performance on fuel poverty in even 
the low energy price scenarios. In those scenarios, it is assumed that the price of gas is 
going to stay about the same as was in 2000, but the standard rate electricity price still 
increases by 2.01p/kWh from 6.75p/kWh to 8.76p/kWh. Since the average electricity 
bill for light and power in a gas-heated home is about £200 a year, that increase 
means that the electricity bill goes up by about £60 to £260, which is not insignificant 
when you consider that the average saving from cavity wall insulation is about £100 a 
year. Under the medium price assumption, where the price of standard rate electricity 
is 9.15p/kWh, the increase in a £200 electricity bill is £70, to £270. Under the high 
price assumption, where the price of standard rate electricity is 10.04p/kWh, the 
increase in a £200 electricity bill is nearly £100, to about £300. 
 
What is more, the increase in the price of electricity affects electrically-heated homes 
particularly badly. They have an increase in the average price of heating for homes 
with off-peak electricity from about 3.10p/kWh to 5.11p/kWh, a 65% increase –and 
that is the low cost assumption. The medium cost assumption is an increase of 77% to 
5.50p/kWh and the high cost assumption is an increase of 106% to 6.39p/kWh. 
Electrical heating becomes much more expensive than it is now. By comparison, the 
cost of gas does not increase so much. In the low price projection, it is 1.74p/kWh, an 
insignificant 2% increase on the 2000 price of 1.71p/kWh. In the medium price 
scenario, it is 2.05p/kWh, a 20% increase on 2000 prices. There is only a large price 
rise in the high price scenario, where it is 2.76p/kWh, a 61% increase. 
 
There is a caveat to the Government’s fuel poverty commitment – fuel poverty is to 
be abolished ‘as far as reasonably practical’. What does that mean? The medium 
efficiency scenario was designed to achieve about 95% implementation of all the 
standard energy efficiency measures (central heating, loft insulation, cavity wall 
insulation where there are cavities), regarded as near saturation level, and 10% 
implementation of the more ambitious measures (solid wall insulation, dCHP and heat 
pumps). Under the high efficiency and medium income scenario with moderate 
warming, where all the measures are pursued to 100%, fuel poverty levels are only 
about half as high and emissions are 31.3% lower, having fallen by 47.9% compared 
to 1990 levels, not just 24.3%. The question is whether the more ambitious measures 
be implemented almost universally by 2030. 
 
However, in order to bring fuel poverty numbers down close to negligible levels in 
the moderate warming or even the high warming scenarios, it is necessary to boost the 
incomes of the poor through Scandinavian-style redistribution. At this point, it should 
be mentioned that incomes reported in the EHCS differ from those in income surveys 
such as the Family Resources Survey because although some respondents report 
extremely low incomes, in EHCS they are always increased to equal what a household 
of that composition would receive on means-tested benefits. However, this does not 
entirely resolve the problem of under-reporting of income in surveys by some of the 
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self-employed. It should be borne in mind that some of the fuel poverty shown in the 
tables could be an artefact of households which in fact have higher incomes being 
treated as though they live on means-tested benefits. 
 
Comparing how the different dimensions of the scenarios interact, there is more fuel 
poverty with low energy efficiency and high incomes than with high energy efficiency 
and low incomes. However, medium energy efficiency and high incomes lead to less 
fuel poverty than high energy efficiency and medium incomes, although medium 
energy efficiency and low incomes lead to more fuel poverty than low energy 
efficiency and medium incomes. 
 
Fuel poverty levels are much lower in scenarios with high incomes and high energy 
prices than in otherwise equivalent ones with low incomes and low energy prices. In 
fact they are lower than in otherwise equivalent scenarios with medium incomes and 
low prices. Fuel poverty levels are about the same in scenarios with medium incomes 
and high prices as in otherwise equivalent scenarios with low incomes and low prices. 
This shows that the variation in incomes has more impact on fuel poverty than the 
variation in prices. 
 
There is much less fuel poverty with high incomes and cooling than with low incomes 
and high warming. There is even much less fuel poverty with cooling and medium 
incomes than with rapid warming and low incomes. There is slightly less fuel poverty 
with cooling and high incomes than with rapid warming and medium incomes. The 
variation in incomes has much more impact on the levels of fuel poverty than the 
variation in temperatures. 
 
Fuel poverty is about the same in scenarios with cooling and low energy prices as in 
scenarios with high warming and high energy prices. Fuel poverty is lower with high 
warming and medium prices than with moderate warming and low prices, while 
cooling and medium prices lead to about the same amount of fuel poverty as moderate 
warming and high prices. The variation in temperatures and the variation in energy 
prices each have about the same impact on levels of fuel poverty. 
 
Fuel poverty is lower with high efficiency and high prices than with low efficiency 
and low prices. It is also lower with high efficiency and medium prices than with 
medium efficiency and low prices, but lower with low efficiency and medium prices 
than medium efficiency and high prices. The variation in efficiency has more impact 
on the levels of fuel poverty than the variation in prices. 
 
The most interesting relationship has been kept for last. Energy consumption, carbon 
emissions and fuel poverty are all significantly lower with cooling and high efficiency 
than with high warming and low efficiency and about the same as with moderate 
warming and medium efficiency. Moderate warming and medium efficiency leads to 
slightly higher emissions but slightly lower energy expenditure and fuel poverty than 
the high warming and low efficiency scenario (this difference is because of the 
different relative effects on gas and electricity consumption). The range in energy 
efficiency has a greater impact on both emissions and fuel poverty than the range in 
temperatures. To emphasise, emissions and fuel poverty would be about the same if 
England cooled by 2°C and the maximum efficiency scenario had been followed as 
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emissions and fuel poverty would be if England warmed by 4°C and the medium 
efficiency scenario had been followed. 
 
The answer to the threat of collapse of the THC and cooling leading to increased 
carbon emissions and increased fuel poverty is clear. It is to make additional 
improvements to household energy efficiency. The only other approach to tackle fuel 
poverty (since the climate and world energy prices are not in any significant way 
under the influence of British government policy) would be significant redistribution. 
However, the scale of the redistribution required would be very substantial… 
 
An obvious objection to the idea of improving household energy efficiency to 
compensate for cooling is that although it would be fairly easy to follow the medium 
efficiency scenario rather than the minimum efficiency scenario, the maximum 
efficiency scenario is impractical because it requires insulating all the solid-walled 
homes. Internal wall insulation would be too disruptive and external wall insulation 
would be denounced as architectural vandalism by the heritage lobby. 
 
Another objection that could be made is that insulating solid walls is just not cost 
effective. But what is the impact of the different temperature and energy price 
scenarios on the cost-effectiveness of energy efficiency measures? For that matter, 
would some measures that are currently cost effective stop being cost effective if 
there was rapid warming? 
 
The effect on heating costs of the three different temperature and the three different 
energy price scenarios is shown below. Because both prices and the changes in the 
prices of gas and electricity are so different, they are shown separately. 
 
As already stated, the price of gas to domestic customers rises by 2% from the level of 
2000 in the low price scenario, by 20% in the medium price scenario and by 61% in 
the high price scenario. The price of off-peak electric heating to domestic customers 
rises by 65% in the low price scenario, by 77% in the medium price scenario and by 
106% in the high price scenario. 
 
The effect on heating demand of the three different temperature scenarios can be 
calculated from examining different model runs. The effect on space heating demand 
(in the low efficiency scenario, which is not confused by the different amounts of 
dCHP viable at different temperatures as the maximum efficiency scenario and the 
medium efficiency scenario are) is that in the cooling scenario space heating demand 
increases by 30%, in the moderate warming scenario space heating demand decreases 
by 15% and in the rapid warming scenario space heating demand decreases by 45%. 
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Table 7 Relative gas heating costs in the different scenarios (2000 level=1) 
 
 Cooling Moderate warming High warming 
High energy prices 2.09 1.37 0.89 
Medium energy prices 1.56 1.02 0.66 
Low energy prices 1.33 0.87 0.56 
 
Table 8 Relative off-peak electric heating costs in the different scenarios (2000 
level=1) 
 
 Cooling Moderate warming High warming 
High energy prices 2.68 1.75 1.13 
Medium energy prices 2.30 1.50 0.97 
Low energy prices 2.15 1.40 0.91 
 
The current costs and annual savings from different energy efficiency measures are 
based on calculations by the Buildings Research Establishment using the BREDEM 
model and a table provided by EST. Payback times have been calculated by the 
authors. In the table below, the gas figure is for an average-sized home with a 90% 
efficient A-rated condensing boiler and the electric figure is for an average-sized 
home with electric storage heating 
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Table 9 Current costs and annual savings times of energy efficiency measures 
with a 90% efficient gas boiler or electric storage heating 
 
 
The figures for internal wall insulation are based on the assumption that it is carried 
out when the home is being refurbished anyway. Internal wall insulation requires 
removing radiators before it is installed and then refitting them afterwards. It also 
requires redecorating at least the external wall or walls of the room – in practice, 
redecoration of the entire room is the most practical option. If refurbishment is not 
taking place at the same time, costs are much higher, perhaps double those quoted, 
although they may still be lower than for external wall insulation. 
 
A rate of return of 6% is equivalent to a payback period of 12 years. This is about the 
rate of interest on a mortgage. However, private discount rates for energy efficiency 
Insulation 
measure 
Cost (£) Life of 
measure
£/year 
saving 
(gas) 
Carbon 
saving 
kgC/yr 
(gas) 
Payback 
years 
(gas) 
£/year 
saving 
(electric) 
Carbon 
saving 
kgC/yr 
(electric)
Payback 
years 
(electric)
External wall 
insulation(u=0.35) 
3500-5500 
(1500 
marginal 
over 
maintenance) 
Not 
known 
115 460 30-48 
(13 if 
needs 
work 
anyway)
210 1110 17-26 
(7 if 
needs 
work 
anyway) 
Internal wall 
insulation 
(u=0.35) 
1200 Life of 
building
115 460 10 210 1110 6 
Internal wall 
insulation 
(u=0.45) 
1000 Life of 
building
110 440 9 200 1060 5 
Cavity wall 
insulation 
500 Life of 
building
65 265 7.5 115 640 4.5 
Single to low-e 
double glazing 
2400-4000 15-20 30 120 80-130 55 290 45-70 
years 
Secondary glazing 
(u-value=3.0) 
 15 20 85  70 195  
Draught-stripping 
windows and 
doors 
210 15 5 25 40 10 65 20 
Hot water tank 
insulation 
20 Life of 
tank 
25 95 1 45 150 0.5 
Loft insulation 
250mm in empty 
roof 
325 Life of 
building
70 270 4.5 125 690 2.5 
Loft insulation 
top-up to 250mm 
from 100mm 
265 Life of 
building
10 45 25 20 105 13 
Solar water 
heating 
2500-4000 
(1500 bulk) 
 25 90 100-160 
(60 
bulk) 
45 175 55-100 
(33 
bulk) 
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are often much higher and require faster payback times. Householders often demand a 
payback time of four years, equivalent to a rate of return of 19%. It can be seen that at 
present energy prices, the only measure that most gas-heated homes do not have 
which is cost-effective using a 6% discount rate for a home with a 90% efficient 
condensing boiler of return is cavity wall insulation. For solid-walled homes, internal 
insulation is cost effective if the home is being refurbished anyway and external wall 
insulation is nearly cost-effective if maintenance work is needed anyway. They are a 
long way from being cost-effective on their own. Even upgrading loft insulation from 
100mm to 250mm is not cost-effective, but although loft insulation is listed as having 
a lifetime equivalent to the life of the building, other sources state that loft insulation 
is only effective for 30 years. The loft insulation installed in the 1970s is now nearing 
the end of its effective life and its replacement is clearly cost-effective. Double 
glazing and solar water heating are a very long way from being cost-effective. 
However, double glazing is cost effective even in gas-heated homes with a 90% 
efficient condensing boiler when windows need replacing anyway and is now 
required by building regulations for replacement windows. 
 
The Treasury discount rate is now 3.5% (HM Treasury 2003) and the Government 
takes the social cost of carbon emissions to be £70 per tonne of carbon in 2000, rising 
by £1 per tonne of carbon each subsequent year (Clarkson and Deyes 2002). Under 
those assumptions, external wall insulation becomes cost-effective if maintenance is 
needed anyway and upgrading loft insulation also becomes cost-effective, but solid-
wall insulation on its own still does not become cost-effective. Double glazing and 
solar water heating remain a long way from being cost-effective. 
 
The effect of the different climate and energy price scenarios alter what is cost-
effective at a 6% discount rate for a home with a 90% efficient condensing boiler (by 
2030 there will be almost no boilers still operating that are not condensing boilers), 
but most measures are unaffected because they are either extremely cost-effective (hot 
water tank insulation and having some loft insulation) or a very long way from being 
cost-effective (solar water heating, double glazing, draught-proofing, external wall 
insulation unless work is needed anyway). Among the scenarios with higher heating 
costs (the three cooling scenarios and two of the three moderate warming scenarios) 
all except the moderate warming and medium energy prices scenario bring into cost-
effectiveness external wall insulation if work is needed anyway. At the extreme, 
cooling and high energy prices raise the cost of gas heating by a factor of 2.09. It is 
the only scenario that makes internal wall insulation cost-effective with a 6% discount 
rate in most cases where refurbishment is not necessary anyway. It also brings 
upgrading loft insulation from 100mm to 250mm to a payback time of 12 years, on 
the border of being cost effective with a 6% discount rate. With the scenarios which 
lower the cost of heating (the three rapid warming scenarios and one of the moderate 
warming scenarios), external wall insulation if work is needed anyway is pushed 
further away from being cost-effective with a 6% discount rate and both high 
warming with low energy prices and high warming with medium energy prices push 
internal wall insulation out of cost-effectiveness with a 6% discount rate even if the 
home is being refurbished anyway. With high warming and low energy prices, cavity 
wall insulation has a payback time of 11 years, making it only just cost-effective with 
a 6% discount rate. It should be borne in mind, though, that cavity wall insulation is 
used in countries that are already much warmer than Britain, such as Australia, not 
only to keep warm in low temperatures but also to keep cool in high temperatures. 
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For a discount rate of 3.5% and the social cost of carbon emissions £70 per tonne of 
carbon in 2000, rising by £1 per tonne of carbon each subsequent year, the social cost 
of carbon in 2030 is £100 per tonne. In the scenarios with higher costs (the three 
cooling scenarios and two of the three moderate warming scenarios) all except the 
moderate warming and medium energy prices scenario bring solid wall insulation on 
its own into cost-effectiveness. Double glazing and solar water heating remain far 
from being cost effective. In the scenarios with lower heating costs, external 
insulation if work is needed anyway remains cost-effective, but topping up loft 
insulation from 75mm to 250mm stops being cost effective. 
 
For homes with off-peak electric storage heating, cavity wall insulation, internal 
insulation if the home is being refurbished anyway and external wall insulation if 
maintenance work is needed anyway are all easily cost effective with a 6% discount 
rate at present temperatures and prices. Internal wall insulation will be cost-effective 
with a 6% discount rate in many cases where refurbishment is not necessary, 
depending very much on the cost of redecoration. Upgrading loft insulation is nearly 
cost-effective with a 6% discount rate even if it is not nearing the end of its effective 
life. Double glazing and solar water heating remain a very long way from being cost-
effective. 
 
With a 3.5% discount rate and the social cost of carbon emissions £70 per tonne of 
carbon in 2000, rising by £1 per tonne of carbon each subsequent year, upgrading loft 
insulation is cost-effective, both internal and external solid wall insulation are cost-
effective in their own right, but double glazing and solar water heating remain not 
cost-effective. 
 
What is the impact of changes in temperatures and energy prices in the different 
scenarios for the cost-effectiveness of measures in homes which have electric storage 
heating? Only two of the scenarios (high warming with low energy costs and high 
warming with medium energy costs) see a reduction in heating costs and it is small, 
making no significant difference to the cost-effectiveness of measures. In the high 
warming with high energy costs scenario, heating costs increase 13%, bringing 
upgrading loft insulation from 100mm to 250mm into cost-effectiveness and making 
internal wall insulation cost-effective with a 6% discount rate in some more cases. 
Moderate warming with low energy prices increases heating costs by 40%, just 
bringing the cheapest external wall insulation into cost-effectiveness with a 6% 
discount rate even if other work is not needed externally. Moderate warming with 
medium energy prices increases heating costs by 50% above recent levels and brings 
only more cases of external and internal wall insulation into cost-effectiveness with a 
6% discount rate. Moderate warming with high energy prices increases heating costs 
by 75% above recent levels and brings draught-proofing into cost-effectiveness with a 
6% discount rate, although it is not an important measure, as well as more cases of 
external wall insulation and internal wall insulation that requires redecoration. 
Cooling with low energy prices increases heating costs 115% above recent levels and 
brings external wall insulation into cost-effectiveness in all cases with a 6% discount 
rate and more cases of internal wall insulation that requires redecoration. Cooling 
with medium energy prices increases heating costs 130% above recent levels and 
brings yet more cases of internal wall insulation that requires redecoration into cost-
effectiveness with a 6% discount rate. Cooling with high energy prices increases 
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heating costs 168% above recent levels and brings more cases of internal wall 
insulation that requires redecoration into cost effectiveness with a 6% discount rate 
and nearly brings bulk installation of solar water heating into cost-effectiveness. 
 
With a 3.5% discount rate and the social cost of carbon emissions £100 per tonne of 
carbon in 2030, rising by £1 per tonne of carbon each subsequent year, double glazing 
may be cost-effective in the cooling scenarios, depending on how expensive it is, bulk 
solar water heating is cost-effective in the moderate warming and the cooling 
scenarios, and individual solar water heating edges into cost-effectiveness in the 
cooling and high energy price scenario. 
 
Next, consider the impact of the changes in temperatures and energy prices in the 
different scenarios on standard rate electric heating. In the scenarios, it is assumed 
that this kind of heating, which is extremely expensive, will not be used by 2030 in 
the form of conventional electric resistance heating. However, in the maximum 
efficiency scenario it is assumed that all electric heating has moved over to heat 
pumps on standard rate electricity and in the medium efficiency scenario that 10% of 
electrically heated homes have done so, although 90% are on electric storage heating. 
 
In the low energy price scenario, the cost of standard rate electricity is assumed to rise 
by 30% by 2030, in the medium energy price scenario it rises by 35% and in the high 
energy price scenario it rises by 49% Again, in the cooling scenario space heating 
demand increases by 30%, in the moderate warming scenario space heating demand 
decreases by 15% and in the rapid warming scenario space heating demand decreases 
by 45%. 
 
Table 10 Relative standard rate electric heating costs in the different scenarios 
(2000 level=1) 
 
 Cooling Moderate warming High warming 
High energy prices 1.94 1.27 0.82 
Medium energy prices 1.75 1.15 0.74 
Low energy prices 1.69 1.10 0.71 
 
The table below shows the results for conventional electric heating with standard rate 
electricity and the authors’ calculation for the results with 350% efficient heat pumps 
at present energy prices. It should of course be borne in mind that heat pumps 
currently cost a few thousand pounds, but unlike other measures, it is reasonable to 
expect the cost to fall dramatically by 2030. 
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Table 11 Current costs and annual savings times of energy efficiency measure 
with standard rate electricity 
 
 
For electrically heated homes on standard rate electricity, all measures are already 
cost-effective with a 6% discount rate except double glazing and solar water heating. 
With a 3.5% discount rate and a social cost of carbon of £70 per tonne in 2000, rising 
by £1 per tonne per year, double glazing and solar water heating are also cost-
effective. It is assumed in the scenarios that conventional resistance heating on 
standard rate electricity will not be used by 2030. 
 
At present electricity prices, savings and payback times for a home with a heat pump 
are similar to those with a 90% efficient condensing gas boiler. Hot water tank 
insulation, loft insulation in an empty roof and cavity wall insulation are all definitely 
cost-effective with a 6% discount rate. Internal wall insulation is cost-effective with a 
6% discount rate if the house needs refurbishment anyway. External wall insulation is 
just cost-effective with a 6% discount rate (payback 11 years) if work is needed 
anyway. The other measures are not cost-effective with a 6% discount rate. 
 
Insulation 
measure 
Cost (£) Life of 
measure 
Carbon 
saving 
kgC/yr 
(resistance) 
£/year saving 
(resistance) 
Payback 
years 
(resistance) 
Carbon 
saving 
kgC/yr 
(heat 
pump) 
£/year 
saving 
(heat 
pump) 
Payback 
years 
(heat 
pump) 
External wall 
insulation(u=0.35) 
3500-5500 
(1500 
marginal 
over 
maintenance) 
Not 
known 
1110 490 7-11 
(3 if needs 
work 
anyway) 
315 140 25-40 
(11 if 
needs 
work 
anyway) 
Internal wall 
insulation 
(u=0.35) 
1200 Life of 
building 
1110 490 2.5 315 140 8 
Internal wall 
insulation 
(u=0.45) 
1000 Life of 
building 
1060 465 2 305 130 8 
Cavity wall 
insulation 
500 Life of 
building 
640 285 2 185 80 6 
Single to low-e 
double glazing 
2400-4000 15-20 290 125 19-32 years 85 35 70-115 
years 
Secondary glazing 
(u-value=3.0) 
 15 195 70  55 20  
Draught-stripping 
windows and 
doors 
210 15 65 30 7 20 10 20 
Hot water tank 
insulation 
20 Life of 
tank 
150 120 2 months 45 35 0.5 
Loft insulation 
250mm in empty 
roof 
325 Life of 
building 
690 270 1 195 75 4.5 
Loft insulation 
top-up to 250mm 
from 100mm 
265 Life of 
building 
105 45 6 30 15 18 
Solar water 
heating 
2500-4000 
(1500 bulk) 
 175 110 23-37 
(14 bulk) 
50 30 80-130 
(50 
bulk) 
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With a 3.5% discount rate and a social cost of carbon of £70 per tonne in 2000, rising 
by £1 per tonne per annum, topping up loft insulation, draught-proofing and both 
internal and external solid wall insulation are cost-effective, but double glazing and 
solar water heating are far from being cost-effective. 
 
Looking to the future, in all the high warming scenarios, heating costs decrease and 
external wall insulation ceases to be cost-effective with a 6% discount rate even if 
work is needed anyway, but the other measures that are presently cost-effective 
remain cost-effective. In the moderate warming scenarios, heating costs rise slightly, 
so external wall insulation becomes more definitely cost-effective with a 6% discount 
rate if work is needed anyway. In the cooling scenarios, heating costs nearly double 
and so internal wall insulation becomes cost-effective with a 6% discount rate in 
many cases even where refurbishment is not necessary anyway. In addition, 
increasing loft insulation from 100mm to 250mm becomes cost-effective with a 6% 
discount rate even if the existing insulation is not nearing the end of its life. 
 
With a 3.5% discount rate and a social cost of carbon of £100 per tonne in 2030, 
rising by £1 per tonne per year, external solid wall insulation is not cost-effective on 
its own in the high warming scenarios, although it is cost-effective if work is needed 
anyway. The other measures that are cost-effective under present circumstances 
remain cost-effective. In the moderate warming and the cooling scenarios, there is no 
change from present - topping up loft insulation, draught-proofing and both internal 
and external solid wall insulation are cost-effective, but double glazing and solar 
water heating are far from being cost-effective. 
 
Since heating an average-sized home with filled cavity walls and an insulated loft, but 
electric storage heating costs about £350 a year now, which could be reduced by 
about £125 a year by switching to a heat pump on standard rate electricity, a heat 
pump would have to cost less than £1500 to be cost-effective at a 6% discount rate or 
about £3000 with a discount rate of 3.5% and a social cost of carbon of £75 per tonne, 
rising at £1 per tonne per year. With electric heating costs increasing substantially in 
all the scenarios except those with rapid warming, it can be seen that switching to a 
heat pump may be cost-effective even in that situation by 2030. Heating an average-
sized home with solid walls and an insulated loft, electric storage heating costs about 
£500 a year now, which would be reduced by nearly £200 a year by switching to a 
heat pump on standard rate electricity. A heat pump would have to cost less than 
about £2500 to be cost-effective at a 6% discount rate or about £5000 with a discount 
rate of 3.5% and a social cost of carbon of £75 per tonne, rising at £1 per tonne per 
year. 
 
The biggest problems with internal and external wall insulation are not really about 
their cost-effectiveness. External wall insulation suffers from the disadvantages of its 
high capital cost, the need to get planning permission to fit it and that many people 
regard it as unattractive. Internal wall insulation is already cost-effective for many 
electrically-heated homes, but the inconvenience of installing it means that it is almost 
never done except in vacant homes that need refurbishment anyway.  
 
The technology which has not been considered so far in this section is micro-CHP. It 
is much more difficult to talk in general about the savings from micro-CHP because 
they depend so much on the heat demand of the building. Stirling engine micro-CHP 
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technology has to be of a certain size and heat demand to be efficient. Savings are 
therefore not easily scaled as they can be for other measures – there needs to be a 
significant heat demand for space heating and hot water to make one preferable to a 
condensing gas boiler. The threshold is a total thermal demand (space heating and hot 
water) of about 12,000 kWh per annum. 
 
But it is possible to go back and adjust the results from the ECI simulation. In the 
medium efficiency scenarios 90% of gas-heated homes have 92% efficient 
condensing gas boilers while only 10% of gas-heated homes with sufficient heat 
demand have micro-CHP. What if we increase the proportion of such homes with 
micro-CHP to 95%? What happens to carbon emissions and fuel poverty in that case? 
 
Table 12 shows the results. Comparing this table with the results for the medium 
efficiency scenarios in Tables 4 to 6, it can be seen that carbon emissions are only 
about 3 to 4% than in those scenarios, whereas in the high efficiency scenarios they 
were about 15% less than the medium efficiency scenarios with high warming, about 
30% less with cooling and halfway between those with moderate warming. When the 
results for fuel poverty levels are compared, though, the levels of fuel poverty are 
almost as low as in the maximum efficiency scenario. So just adding micro-CHP can 
do almost as much for fuel poverty as making all possible energy efficiency 
improvements, including micro-CHP. The reason for this is that when all efficiency 
improvements are made a smaller proportion of homes have a combined thermal 
demand above 12,000 kWh a year (particularly among solid-wall homes), so a smaller 
number of properties can effectively use micro-CHP. The financial savings on the 
electricity bill from micro-CHP are almost as great as the financial savings on the 
heating bill from maximum insulation. 
 
Another way to reduce bills and carbon emissions is to install heat pumps in homes 
that are electrically heated. Gas heating would be cheaper to run, but the carbon 
emissions are higher. The carbon emissions of a kilowatt-hour of heat from gas are 
0.19kg. With a 90% efficient gas boiler they are 0.21kg. The carbon dioxide 
emissions from a kilowatt-hour of electricity now are about 0.43kg, but according to 
DTI (2003c) predictions by 2030 they will be only 0.24kg (85% of electricity from 
68% efficient combined cycle gas turbines and the rest from carbon-free sources). A 
kilowatt-hour of heat from a 350% efficient heat pump would only emit 0.07kg of 
carbon dioxide – a third of the emissions from a 90% efficient gas boiler. The 
disadvantage is that using a heat pump will be more expensive than using gas. 
 
When the proportion of heat pumps in electrically heated homes is raised to 95% in 
addition to the 95% of suitable gas-heated homes, fuel poverty falls a bit further, to 
about the same level as in the maximum efficiency scenarios, but carbon dioxide 
emissions fall only a small amount and remain well above the levels in the maximum 
efficiency scenarios. 
 
It might be possible to instead extend the coverage of the gas network to virtually all 
homes. The running cost of gas heating is expected to be slightly cheaper than heat 
pumps in 2030, so fuel poverty would be marginally lower than shown in Table 13, 
but because the carbon emission of gas heating will be only slightly lower than those 
of conventional electric heating in 2030, emissions would be about the same as shown 
in Table 12. 
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The heavy reliance on gas that is assumed to continue until 2030 makes sense in terms 
of reducing fuel poverty, but less sense in terms of minimising carbon emissions. Heat 
pumps are the way to do that. As renewables and carbon capture will be developed 
during the course of the century to reduce emissions and gas will become increasingly 
scarce and expensive, a long-term transition to heat pumps as the predominant method 
of heating should be planned. 
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Table 12: Medium Efficiency Scenarios with 95% rather than 10% dCHP 
 
 Temperature Growth/ 
Distribution 
Energy  
price 
CO2 
emissions 
(million 
tonnes) 
% change  
emissions 
since 1990
£ Billion 
domestic  
energy 
Fuel poor 
households 
% fuel poor 
households 
1 High High High  77.15 -38.3% 18.45 50,000 0.2 
2 High High Medium  77.15 -38.3% 15.56 <25,000 <0.1 
3 High High Low 77.15 -38.3% 14.30 <25,000 <0.1 
4 High Medium High  74.75 -40.2 17.65 550,000 2.3 
5 High Medium Medium  74.75 -40.2 14.85 300,000 1.2 
6 High Medium Low 74.75 -40.2 13.63 225,000 0.9 
7 High Low High  70.81 -43.4 16.60 1,250,000 5.6 
8 High Low Medium  70.81 -43.4 13.95 900,000 4.1 
9 High Low Low 70.81 -43.4 12.80 800,000 3.6 
10 Moderate High High  94.27 -24.6 20.47 125,000 0.5 
11 Moderate High Medium  94.27 -24.6 16.94 50,000 0.2 
12 Moderate High Low 94.27 -24.6 15.40 <25,000 <0.1 
13 Moderate Medium High  91.94 -26.4 19.64 750,000 3.3 
14 Moderate Medium Medium  91.94 -26.4 16.21 400,000 1.7 
15 Moderate Medium Low 91.94 -26.4 14.70 275,000 1.3 
16 Moderate Low High  87.30 -30.2 18.54 1,525,000 6.8 
17 Moderate Low Medium  87.30 -30.2 15.28 1,100,000 4.9 
18 Moderate Low Low 87.30 -30.2 13.85 925,000 4.1 
19 Cooling High High  119.74 -4.2 23.52 325,000 1.3 
20 Cooling High Medium  119.74 -4.2 19.04 100,000 0.4 
21 Cooling High Low 119.74 -4.2 17.08 50,000 0.2 
22 Cooling Medium High  117.51 -6.0 22.71 1,175,000 5.0 
23 Cooling Medium Medium  117.51 -6.0 18.32 625,000 2.7 
24 Cooling Medium Low 117.51 -6.0 16.40 425,000 1.8 
25 Cooling Low High  111.68 -10.7 21.44 2,050,000 9.2 
26 Cooling Low Medium  111.68 -10.7 17.26 1,350,000 6.0 
27 Cooling Low Low 111.68 -10.7 15.44 1,100,000 4.9 
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Figure 7: CO2 emissions (million tonnes) in medium efficiency scenarios with 
95% rather than 10% micro-CHP 
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Figure 8: Percentage of fuel poor households in medium efficiency scenarios with 
95% rather than 10% micro-CHP 
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Table 13: Medium Efficiency Scenarios with 95% rather than 10% micro-CHP 
and 95% rather than 10% heat pumps 
 
 
 Temperature Growth/ 
Distribution 
Energy  
price 
CO2 
emissions 
(million 
tonnes) 
% change  
emissions 
since 1990 
£ Billion 
domestic 
energy 
Fuel poor 
households 
 
% fuel poor  
households 
1 High High High  73.99 -40.8% 17.75 50,000 0.2 
2 High High Medium  73.99 -40.8% 14.99 <25,000 <0.1 
3 High High Low 73.99 -40.8% 13.78 <25,000 <0.1 
4 High Medium High  71.67 -42.3 16.96 450,000 1.8 
5 High Medium Medium  71.67 -42.3 14.29 250,000 1.1 
6 High Medium Low 71.67 -42.3 13.12 175,000 0.8 
7 High Low High  67.87 -45.7 15.95 1,150,000 5.2 
8 High Low Medium  67.87 -45.7 13.41 825,000 3.7 
9 High Low Low 67.87 -45.7 12.31 725,000 3.2 
10 Moderate High High  90.11 -27.9 19.55 100,000 0.4 
11 Moderate High Medium  90.11 -27.9 16.18 25,000 0.1 
12 Moderate High Low 90.11 -27.9 14.71 <25,000 <0.1 
13 Moderate Medium High  87.85 -29.7 18.73 650,000 2.7 
14 Moderate Medium Medium  87.85 -29.7 15.45 325,000 1.4 
15 Moderate Medium Low 87.85 -29.7 14.02 225,000 1.0 
16 Moderate Low High  83.39 -33.3 17.67 1,400,000 6.3 
17 Moderate Low Medium  83.39 -33.3 14.56 925,000 4.1 
18 Moderate Low Low 83.39 -33.3 13.20 775,000 3.5 
19 Cooling High High  114.05 -8.8 22.25 250,000 1.0 
20 Cooling High Medium  114.05 -8.8 18.00 75,000 0.3 
21 Cooling High Low 114.05 -8.8 16.14 50,000 0.2 
22 Cooling Medium High  111.87 -10.5 21.46 1,000,000 4.1 
23 Cooling Medium Medium  111.87 -10.5 17.29 500,000 2.0 
24 Cooling Medium Low 111.87 -10.5 15.46 325,000 1.4 
25 Cooling Low High  106.30 -15.0 20.24 1,775,000 8.0 
26 Cooling Low Medium  106.30 -15.0 16.28 1,150,000 5.2 
27 Cooling Low Low 106.30 -15.0 14.55 950,000 4.3 
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Figure 9: CO2 emissions (million tonnes) in medium efficiency scenarios with 
95% rather than 10% micro-CHP and 95% rather than 10% heat pumps 
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Figure 8: Percentage of fuel poor households in medium efficiency scenarios with 
95% rather than 10% micro-CHP and 95% rather than 10% heat pumps 
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Discussion 
 
A number of interesting findings emerge from the research: 
 
1. In the most likely scenarios, fuel poverty will be reduced substantially, but fall 
far short of being abolished in 2030. 
 
2. The range of variation in energy efficiency between the scenarios has more 
impact than the range of temperatures on emissions and fuel poverty levels, so 
improving energy efficiency can compensate for lower temperatures. 
 
3. The interim 40% reduction target by 2030 is easily achieved in high warming 
scenarios with high efficiency and nearly achieved with medium efficiency, 
but only achieved in moderate warming scenarios with high efficiency, and is 
nearly achieved in cooling scenarios with high efficiency. 
 
4. Fuel poverty is only effectively abolished in scenarios with Scandinavian-style 
redistribution and remains substantial even with high efficiency and warming 
if the incomes of the poor rise little due to unequal growth. 
 
5. Expected rising electricity prices worsen fuel poverty and account for some of 
the difficulty in achieving the target of abolition. 
 
6. However, the dramatic reduction in the carbon intensity of electricity 
production reduces total household carbon dioxide emissions by about 20% 
compared to what it would be if the carbon intensity of electricity remained 
similar to what it is today. 
 
7. Micro-CHP can play almost as substantial a role in reducing fuel poverty as 
insulating solid walls, although it does not reduce carbon emissions anything 
like as much. 
 
Two fundamental conclusions can be reached about carbon emissions and about fuel 
poverty. 
 
In the high warming scenarios, medium efficiency measures bring carbon emissions 
down by around the interim target of 40% compared to 1990 levels, but the only way 
for households in the moderate warming scenarios to reduce their carbon emissions by 
40% by 2030 is with the maximum efficiency measures - including the insulation of 
solid walls. The maximum efficiency measures even bring the 40% target close to 
being met in the cooling scenarios. The variant of the medium efficiency scenarios 
with 95% uptake of micro-CHP is only slightly better than the standard medium 
efficiency scenario in terms of carbon emissions, so there is no easy alternative to the 
insulation of solid walls if the domestic sector is to play its part in meeting carbon 
emissions reduction targets. The only other way to achieve the objective would be by 
demolishing solid-wall homes and building new ones, which would be much more 
expensive and even more controversial. 
 
The only way by 2030 to achieve the Government’s target for the abolition of fuel 
poverty is with income redistribution as well as greater energy efficiency. This is the 
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case even in the high warming scenarios. Improving energy efficiency alone cannot 
resolve fuel poverty because some households have very low incomes. This finding 
has important implications. Behind the problem of fuel poverty lies a deeper problem 
of simple income poverty. The energy efficiency of the existing housing stock cannot 
be increased sufficiently for it to resolve the issue on its own. 
 
What kind of policies are required to bring about the necessary changes? If the 
domestic sector is to play its part in bringing about the interim carbon reduction target 
of 40% by 2030, an aggressive programme to insulate solid walls as well as cavity 
walls would be needed, despite the cost, inconvenience and controversy that it would 
entail. If reducing carbon emissions was the only concern, then the replacement of 
conventional gas and electric heating technologies with heat pumps could substitute 
for solid wall insulation, although running costs for consumers would be higher than 
with efficient gas boilers. 
 
If fuel poverty is to be eliminated without concern about reducing carbon emissions, 
extensive solid wall insulation is not necessarily required because micro-CHP can do 
almost as much as solid wall insulation to reduce bills. But there would be a need for 
large-scale income redistribution. If it was to be done through tax credits, as modelled 
in this project, it would require substantial increase in tax on the better off. In 
Scandinavia, there are much higher rates of tax than in the UK, but redistribution is 
more indirect, through more generous benefits, a more extensive state sector and the 
state acting as employer of last resort in what are effectively workfare schemes rather 
like the New Deal in the UK, but with higher rates of pay and applying to larger 
proportion of those who would otherwise be unemployed. 
 
The implausibility of either policy in the present political climate shows the gap 
between the future objectives the government has set for fuel poverty and carbon 
emissions and the measures that are necessary to bring them about. 
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